

UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI

# Security and freedom in counterterrorist legislation

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comparative framing analysis of Japanese  
newspaper discussion

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<p>Tiivistelmä – Referat – Abstract</p> <p>Tutkielman aihe on kahden japanilaisen sanomalehden, Asahi Shimbunin ja Yomiuri Shimbunin, uutisointi parlamentissa 22.3.–16.6.2017 käsitellystä lakialoitteesta. Konservatiivinen hallitus esitteli lakialoitteen terrorismin vastaisena, mutta oppositio kritisoi sitä ihmisoikeuksia vaarantavaksi. Työn tarkoitus on tutkia, miten liberaali Asahi ja konservatiivinen Yomiuri välittävät parlamentissa esiin tulleita näkökantoja ja miten ne kommentoivat tai täydentävät niitä. Tavoitteena on selvittää, miten poliittinen linja vaikuttaa sanomalehden uutisointiin ja miten Japanin heikoksi kritisoitu lehdistönvapaus ilmenee polarisoivan poliittisen keskustelun raportoinnissa.</p> <p>Aineisto koostuu 316 lehtiartikkelista, joista 219 on Asahilta ja 97 Yomiurilta. Aineisto kattaa koko parlamenttikäsittelyn ajan ja on kerätty lehtien online-tietokannoista. Tutkimuksen päämetodi on framing-analyysi ja siihen pohjautuva kvantitatiivinen analyysi, sekä lisäksi kriittiseen diskurssianalyysiin pohjaava kvalitatiivinen analyysi, joka erittelee framing-analyysissa esiin nousseita keskeisiä eroja ja laadullisia piirteitä. Framing-analyysi mallintaa yksityiskohtaisesti, mitä tapoja osapuolet käyttivät oman kantansa ajamisessa ja vastapuolen mustamaalaamisessa.</p> <p>Lehtien kannat eroavat toisistaan suuresti. Yomiurin pääasiallinen malli on turvallisuuden korostaminen, johon liittyy terrorismin pelko ja tiukkojen lakien tarve Tokion olympialaisten turvallisuuden varmistamiseksi. Yomiurin mallin lähteenä oli lähes yksinomaan hallitus. Yomiuri käytti myös huomattavasti tilaa opposition kritisoimiseen sekä omasta että hallituksen aloitteesta. Yomiurin käyttämä uutiskieli oli pääosin virallista ja puolueettoman oloista, mutta aihetta rajaamalla lehti kuitenkin välitti valtaosin hallituksen näkökantoja.</p> <p>Asahin suosima malli painottaa lakialoitteen vaaraa ihmisoikeuksille ja esittää hallituksen itsevaltaisena ja vaarallisena. Asahi toisintaa opposition näkökantoja mutta esittelee myös muita lähteitä. Keskeinen argumentti on, että lain epämääräinen muotoilu mahdollistaa sen käyttämisen tavallisia kansalaisia vastaan ja johtaa valvontayhteiskuntaan. Asahi korostaa huomattavasti kansalaisten vastarintaa ja mielenosoituksia, joita Yomiuri käsitteli hyvin vähän. Asahin käyttämä kieli on Yomiuria värikkäämpää, ja se julkaisee paljon haastatteluja ja mielipidekirjoituksia.</p> <p>Tutkielman johtopäätökset ovat ristiriitaiset. Ero lehtien välillä seurasi poliittista kantaa, ja selvä ero käsittelykulmassa sekä Asahin hallituskriittinen ote osoittavat, että vapaus valita aiheen käsittely on pääosin lehtien käsissä. Kuitenkin Yomiuri toistaa lähes yksinomaan hallituksen kantaa, ja Asahin uutisoinnissa toistuu huoli kansalaisvapauksien tilasta ja painostavasta yhteiskunnallisesta ilmapiiristä.</p>		
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Appendix A. Codebook

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## **1. Introduction**

The thorough mediatisation of the world has made media literacy more necessary than ever. The ways in which the media we consume can affect our views without our notice has been a particular interest of mine ever since I became aware of it. As we are constantly surrounded by a wealth of information sources, awareness of the ways in which the information we take in can be tailored to influence our thinking is, to me, as much a self-preservative measure as it is an academic interest. At the same time, the freedom of the media to investigate and report without interference is deeply important to me as a citizen and as a writer.

The media have a powerful position as agenda setters in the public discourse, but only to the extent they are free to exercise it. Problems in press freedom are an ever-present and even spreading concern in a world turning to strong leaders who do not tolerate criticism, and Japan has not escaped its share of them. Japan's ranking in the Reporters Without Borders (Reporters Sans Frontières, hereafter RSF) World Press Freedom index has floundered, sinking as low as 72 in 2016 and 2017, after a high of 11th in 2010, which is especially concerning given Japan's status as one of the few free democracies in Asia. A further cause for concern has been Prime Minister Abe Shinzō's history of proposing laws that garnered criticism domestically and internationally for their lax approach to the protection of civil freedoms. Japan's past, with a totalitarian government still in living memory, affects this line of concerns especially domestically.

Press freedom is not the only principle under threat. While the internet hands the world to our fingertips, the average internet user's privacy is under constant threat of data mining and our data being sold to the highest bidder. In this environment, the importance of legal action to protect privacy is crucial. Yet at the same time, legislators face pressure to bolster security in the face of domestic and international terrorism. The unpredictable nature of terrorist attacks means that investigative agencies must stay ahead of the prospective attackers, and at the core of the effective measures is the investigation into the communications and data of suspicious individuals. This places security and privacy directly at odds. Finding the balance between effective preventive investigation and the principal human right to privacy and fair treatment is an ongoing discussion in many countries, all the while the recent global trend towards conservatism shifts focus away from the protection of individual freedoms and towards trust in strong leaders.

In Japan the discussion of this balance heated in the spring of 2017, with the publishing of an amendment proposal to the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and Control of Crime Proceeds (hereafter APOC). Prime Minister Abe's government introduced this amendment with the title "terrorism preparation crime proposal" (テロ準備罪法案, *terojunbizai hōan*), and emphasised an upcoming Olympic host's heightened need for effective counterterrorism as one of the driving reasons behind the proposed changes. As with many other counterterrorism laws, the APOC was criticised for the dangers its vague wording posed for human rights, including by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy. Although I have used the word 'counterterrorist' in this work's title to link to the larger international context, the law's actual efficacy for counterterrorism was also questioned in the discussion.

Unsurprisingly, given that the government coalition, Abe's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the supporting party Kōmeitō, has a comfortable majority in both chambers of the Diet, the APOC was approved. It was brought into the Lower House in late March, and passed into law in mid-June, in record time. The parliament discussion was characterised throughout by the amount of strife between the opposition and government, and the short duration of the debate, as well as the shortcuts taken by the government to hasten the law's passing, were frequent causes of criticism.

In order to combine my interests in civil rights and the influencing power of media, I am conducting a framing analysis in this thesis to examine how Japan's two largest newspapers, the conservative *Yomiuri Shimbun* and the liberal *Asahi Shimbun*, reported the parliament discussion surrounding the APOC proposal. *Yomiuri* and *Asahi* were chosen for this analysis because, in addition to being the two largest, they are far apart on the political spectrum yet not extremist in their views, and because of their extensive online databases. My main aim is to examine how their reporting reflects their political alignment, and to what extent they acknowledge the different actors and views in the discussion. The research questions are:

1. How do *Yomiuri* and *Asahi* frame the APOC law itself, and the discussion in the parliament?
2. How are they transmitting partisan sources?
3. To what extent, and how, are they disputing or supplementing them?
4. What are the main linguistic means they use to do this?

Question one is central, and to answer it I will conduct a framing analysis, modifying the method introduced by Baldwin van Gorp. Questions 2–4 will then be answered in a qualitative analysis based on the principles of Norman Fairclough's critical discourse analysis, centring on the differences that come to light in the framing analysis.

For a topic this closely intertwined with civil freedoms and government accountability, not to mention methodologically concerned with the way author bias affects language, a liberal Westerner's bias must be acknowledged up front. The bias is not only mine: much if not most of the academic literature available to me on the topic is written with a distinctly anti-Abe slant. I do not claim to be more knowledgeable about Japan than the Japanese, but I will look at this issue with an outsider view, as neutral as I am able.

Before the analysis, a look into the development of press freedom in Japan is in order, particularly to see the influence of the wartime government's censorship, whose memory still hangs as a shadow over civil rights discussion in contemporary Japan. This review, followed by an introduction of the state of the media field and press freedom today and an introduction of the two newspapers analysed, comprises chapter 2. Chapter 3 will introduce the APOC proposal and the accompanying debate in detail.

In chapter 4 I will introduce the theoretical framework behind my thinking and the relevant concepts, devoting subchapters to the role of the journalist in newswriting (4.1), the concept of frame and the relation of frame and reality (4.2), and the principles of critical discourse analysis that guide my qualitative analysis (4.3). Chapter 5 introduces the methods I will use, the framing analysis in 5.1 and the qualitative analysis in 5.2, with a closer look at my research aim and hypothesis in 5.3 and an introduction of the newspaper dataset and how it was gathered in 5.4.

Chapters 6, 7, and 8 will cover the analysis itself. In chapter 6, I describe the first phase of the framing analysis and introduce the main frames that were identified and the framing devices that represent them. Chapters 7 and 8 make up the bulk of the thesis. Chapter 7 focuses on the quantitative analysis, and covers first the nature of the newspaper coverage itself (7.1), then takes a look at how the newspapers transmitted the identified frames over time and across different types of articles (7.2). Chapter 7.3 takes a look at the different framing devices identified in chapter 6.3, describing which devices were the most prominent, and comparing the differences between the two newspapers.



Finally, chapter 8 uses the tools of critical discourse analysis to give a qualitative description and analysis of the dataset, supplementing the downsides of a quantitative primary analysis method. After descriptions of the major features of both newspapers and a brief look into the similarities they have, chapter 8.4 compares some major distinguishing features. In chapter 9 I will present the conclusions I have come to.

Some notes on the conventions used in this thesis: I will use Hepburn romanisation for Japanese, except where a conventional English spelling exists, such as Tokyo, and in the names *Asahi Shimbun* and *Yomiuri Shimbun*, which are the spellings the newspapers themselves use. Names appear in the text in the order of their native cultural convention: Japanese names surname first, Western names surname last. Newspaper articles that are in my dataset are sourced as endnotes; other newspaper articles are sourced along with other references. All translations are mine unless indicated otherwise.

## **2. The Japanese media field and press freedom**

The Japanese media, privately owned and fiercely competitive on both a national and regional level, seem to be diverse, independent and accessible, at least on the surface (Krauss 1996: 357). However, although they are guaranteed complete freedom by the constitution and no official censorship has been in place since the Second World War, the relation of the press and the state is not without conflict, and the policies of the incumbent cabinet in particular have caused concern in the more left-leaning news companies.

The media field has been hampered by some systemic problems throughout its existence. In addition to a history of state censorship, at the core of these problems are the oligarchy of the media field, a long tradition of informal self-censorship, and the structural discouragement of investigative reporting. A brief look at the history of the press and press freedom is in order to place the analysed conversation into appropriate context. The historical sections of this chapter draw heavily from Laurie Freeman (2000: chapter 2), whose work on the history of the Japanese press is comprehensive.

### **2.1 Early development**

The Japanese news media was not born, it was created as part of the Meiji restoration's efforts to "modernise" the country. This top-down origin coloured the development of the industry, as while the Western press crowned itself the Fourth Estate and watchdog of power, the Japanese press largely developed for the purposes of education and entertainment.

During the civil war, the restorative movement that became the Meiji government had become used to both attacking with and being attacked by propaganda. When attacks from remaining Tokugawa supporters in the infant press did not cease after the Meiji government solidified its power, the government enforced a full ban on all publishing as early as April 1868. When the ban was lifted ten months later, it came with severe restrictions: editors had to be pre-approved by the government, and a strict after-publication censorship was in place. This effectively silenced all anti-government publishing, and maintained the top-down information structure. The papers that survived, called the "patronage press" for their close relationship with the state (Freeman 2000: 34), did so by dutifully printing government bulletins and having little to no political content otherwise.

Financial support from the government, both direct and indirect, was an important factor that contributed significantly to the survival and growth of loyalist newspapers. Employees from informants to top management could be directly on the government payroll, which improved the stability of a newspaper's income significantly. Less directly, the government extended its influence by obligating prefectural governments to get newspaper subscriptions.

In addition to financial incentives and restrictive laws governing the press, the government developed a system of extra-legal and informal mechanisms to guide the press into their desired direction. These "consultations" (*kondan*) provided a direct line from the people in power to journalists, invoking a false sense of intimacy. Between the censorship laws and informal pressure from the government, the media applied self-censorship to avoid costly pullbacks of forbidden topics. By the Taishō period the informal measures had become the norm of the system, and formal censorship laws were only invoked if the extra-legal system failed.

With the rise of a civil rights movement in the 1870s, openly partisan political papers began to overtake the loyal patronage papers. These "papers of political discussion" were divided between a government faction, which supported the gradual introduction of civil rights, i.e. a constitution and an elected parliament, and the civil rights movement, which demanded these rights immediately. Increasingly strict censorship laws cracked down on political discussion, and as the goals of the civil rights movement were realised – at the government's pace – both patronage papers and political discussion papers came to be replaced by newspapers that professed a new type of journalist ideology: a formal policy of "impartiality and nonpartisanship" (*fuhen futō*), first adopted by *Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun*, a government partisan paper. This proclamation was largely lip service, but proved a winning move in the short term. It allowed the *Nichi Nichi* to dodge the hand of censorship, increase its circulation, and hold a higher moral ground over its competitors, while still continuing to hold a pro-government position against the civil rights movement and its supporting papers.

Professing independence and apoliticality in the face of a sustained government effort to devalue politics and partisanship was not only a good move to avoid censorship, but also a financially brilliant one. Rebranding content as neutral "news" made the papers appealing to a wider audience, and limiting political discussion only to matters of national unity made them less offensive to the state. In essence, newspapers went back to the fundamental belief of the early Meiji era: that the press should act as the educators of the public, and supporters of the

nation. Formal non-partisanship ended up legitimising the government, which strictly opposed political parties and factionalism.

Alongside the intellectual patronage papers and political discussion papers, both aimed at elites, a more commercially minded category of newspaper had developed. These tabloids or "small newspapers" (*ko shimbun* in contrast to "large newspapers" or *ō shimbun*) dealt more in topics that were of interest to the common people: local news, gossip, and serialised novels. They aimed at mass sales, and stayed safe and profitable by staying out of political discussion. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, established in 1874, began as a *ko shimbun*, and was soon the highest circulating paper in Japan.

The organisational form that ultimately dominated the Japanese newspaper market combined many factors of these earlier types: the financial support from the government of the early industry; the careful editorial self-censorship of the patronage papers; the *fuhen futō* policy of the independent press; and the mass appeal and financial acumen of the *ko shimbun*. This combination of features from *ō shimbun* and *ko shimbun* led to the new type of paper to be called *chū shimbun* or "middle newspapers" (Nakano 2017: 31). The main *chū shimbun* that rose to dominate the industry were *Osaka Asahi Shimbun* and, following its lead, *Osaka Mainichi Shimbun*, the predecessors of the modern day *Asahi* and *Mainichi Shimbun*.

While their commercial origins gave the *chū shimbun* a superior economic organisation and management structure compared to intellectual papers, the first such paper, *Osaka Asahi*, was not very profitable in its early years. In 1882 it agreed to receive covert government funding in exchange for spreading government policy while professing a policy of neutrality, in essence becoming a "camouflage patronage paper" (Freeman 2000: 42). The extra funding combined with increasing commercial success lead to *Osaka Asahi* dominating the Osaka market within a year. *Osaka Mainichi*, established on the same business model, became its main rival. Both these papers soon started Tokyo editions, and with the help of their secret government funding, began and quickly won a circulation war in the capital region. The Osaka based papers received an unexpected boon in the form of the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923, which decimated most of their Tokyo based competitors. Three of their main competitors folded, and only their own Tokyo editions remained. The Tokyo based *Yomiuri Shimbun*, at this time still a gossip paper, was acquired in the aftermath of the earthquake by a powerful ex-bureaucrat, and began its ascent into a more serious news-focused paper.

The press club or *kisha* ('journalist') club system, which is still a central part of Japan's media field, originated as early as 1890 with journalists banding together in order to demand access to the newly formed Diet. This was granted in a limited capacity that benefited newspapers from major cities and started the newspapers on the track of blocking rivals from accessing official information (Freeman 2000: 47). As the following decades saw similar clubs established for other major public actors, the clubs developed rules to regulate their own membership and coordinate the release of information, and the basis of institutionalised newsgathering was formed. Exclusive and limited access to official information gave the clubs a close relationship with their sources, as well as an increasing amount of power over their employers, as clubs could block a newspaper from membership and thus hinder their access to information. At the same time, access to the club was tied to an understanding that only topics approved by the club would be released, and so if a reporter uncovered undesired information, an official needed only to go to their club to have it buried. This systemic discouragement of investigative reporting with the threat of losing access to official news has been a long-standing problem in the Japanese media industry.

## **2.2 Wartime censorship**

The key players of Japan's media field, and the key features that allowed a remarkably efficient co-optation of the system for propaganda purposes during the Second World War, were all in place by the late 1920s. In the 1930s, as fascism rose in the government, measures to control the press were tightened. In 1932 ministries established an "information committee", with the purpose to enact the previously used extra-legal control measures of "administrative guidance". Four years later, the committee moved under the Prime Minister's office and was named the Cabinet Information Committee, then the Cabinet Information Bureau (CIB) in 1937. The CIB became the main point of contact between the government, newspaper management, and journalist press clubs during the war.

Although the Meiji constitution guaranteed freedom of expression, it was conditional as "within the bounds of the law", and as such the government was free to limit expression with wartime special laws (Yamada 2017: 119). The central law that the government relied on to enforce wartime censorship, the Peace Preservation Act (治安維持法, *chian iji hō*) of 1925, had ostensibly been made for the purpose of rooting out communists, and the government had assured the people at the time of its establishment that no ordinary citizens would be targeted with it. However, the scope of the law was expanded with several amendments as the

government's need to control information grew, and the law was used extensively during the war to silence those who dared to question the war effort.

Once the war began, the efforts of the government to control the press were supported by the management of the main newspapers, who sought to cull competition and limit the independence of their journalists. The Nihon Shimbun Renmei (NSR), an association of newspaper publishers, carried out its "national mission" by cooperating with the state special police to enforce a strict one newspaper per prefecture rule, bringing down the number of publishing daily newspapers, weekly magazines and more irregular publications from almost 12,000 combined to 55 between 1941 and 1943 (Freeman 2000: 53). The drastically culled competition led to increased circulation for the main papers, and centralisation made the dissemination of news much easier for the state to control.

In addition to cutting the number of newspapers, the government also implemented a journalist licensing system to exclude insufficiently loyal reporters. Requirements for a license included at least a high school education and a sufficient grasp of "national spirit". Only about half of the applicants obtained the permit to continue operating; the rest were left unemployed as without a license, they were unable to enter press clubs and thus gain access to any official information. As journalists in the clubs resisted these developments, in 1943 the CIB and NSR established a room where all government announcements were to be made, and the existence of other press clubs was no longer recognised.

### **2.3 Post-war development**

The combination of the Peace Preservation Act and the strictly controlled release of information was very efficient in providing the public with a standardised and homogenised image of the war effort, to the point that the American occupation authorities after the war were surprised how little the general Japanese public knew about either the reasons that lead to the war or its actual course. Although the new American-dictated constitution of Japan guaranteed unrestricted free speech in its 21st Article and occupation authorities were quick to dismantle legislative censorship structures, they also took care to implement their own censorship, suppressing the reporting of anti-American topics such as the atomic bombings and crimes committed by US military personnel (Yamada 2017: 120). In Okinawa, directly under US control, this restriction continued until the 1970s (Yoshimoto 2017: 243).

Where the occupation authorities dismantled censorship structures, they focused primarily on legal barriers. The informal system of administrative guidance was left largely untouched, and the problems of the *kisha* clubs received no mention at all until 1949. The clubs had been quickly re-established after the wartime restrictions were lifted, and their exclusive nature and restricted newswriting persisted. When the Allied headquarters took note of "undemocratic" club rules, the changes that followed were largely perfunctory, naming the clubs "associations for friendship and socialising", not newsgathering, while clubs in the meantime blatantly continued to gather news. The most effective change was the Allied decree that clubs should freely permit non-members to participate in press conferences, and that bureaucrats had a *duty* to report their activities to the public, a great change from CIB's wartime stance.

Legally speaking, the height of press freedom in Japan was seen in the 1950s to the 1980s, between the post-war occupation censorship and the later trend of tightening information laws. The 1950 Broadcast Act stipulated a responsibility to report the truth and avoid political bias, but also established the independence of the broadcaster from state control. Although the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications formally held licencing authority, the Broadcast Act was held as an ethical guideline and program contents were rarely interfered with. (Yamada 2017: 124)

Perhaps ironically, the height of media liberty coincides with the height of the *kisha* system: in the 1970s, up to 90% of news content from major outlets came from official sources (Freeman 2000: 60, basing on the data of Hara 1979). A cynic might surmise that the authorities felt no need to control the media, because the media were doing such a good job of it themselves.

Starting in the late 1980s, the Broadcast Act's stated aim of "contributing to the development of a healthy democracy" began to be viewed as a law, rather than an ethical code, and regulatory pressure against individual programs increased (Yamada 2017: 124). This, in turn, coincided with the rise of TV, which eliminated total press club monopoly on politician interviews. At the same time, fast changing governments after Prime Minister Nakasone's long tenure (1982–1987) and strengthening opposition parties eliminated entrenched club journalist relationships, resulting in a slight decline of the system. In 1993 a coalition government of several small parties ousted the LDP from power for the first time since the Second World War, briefly stirring the status quo by inserting itself into the system as an outside-context player. Hopeful signs of increasing investigative journalism after long

nurtured government connections broke down were, however, followed by fast disillusionment and a return to the status quo. (Farley 1996: 157-158)

Since the turn of the millennium, cases of administrative guidance have sharply increased according to Yamato (2017: 125), and a series of new laws that are either regulatory or have the potential to be used to regulate the media have been passed. The most publicly criticised among them has been the 2013 Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (SDS), introduced in order to tighten the Japanese government's control on state secrets and sensitive military information, which garnered a public outcry domestically and internationally for its perceived effect on freedom of information and freedom of the press (Fujita 2014, Repeta 2015). The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, David Kaye, expressed concern for the inadequate definition of which matters could be designated secret, the possibility that journalists would be targeted for punishments for doing their work, and the lack of social norms encouraging the reporting of information that would be of public interest. Kaye especially urged Japan to modify the text of the law to explicitly protect journalists and well-meaning whistle-blowers from punishment (Kaye 2017: 19).

The turn towards a stricter direction is exemplified in the 2016 conduct of then-Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications Takaichi Sanae, who brought up the possibility of using the Broadcast Act and its demand for neutral broadcasting as a reason to deny broadcast licenses to companies that the ministry viewed as failing in the neutrality requirement (*The Japan Times* 9.2.2016), in stark contrast to the early view of the Act as an ethical code for broadcasters. This is characteristic of a larger trend in Japanese politics, the shift away from the post-war constitution's requirement for pacifism and a revisionist attitude towards war history, as a new generation of politicians, free from the memories and pressures of the Second World War, have risen to the fore. These politicians, Abe Shinzō's generation, are behind the increasingly hawkish policies over recent years.

Politicians cannot, however, be called the sole driving motor of Japan's increasingly right-wing direction. According to Nakano Koichi, the media began shifting to the right with *Sankei Shimbun* in the 1970s, when *Sankei* started to criticise other newspapers as "'biased' and left-leaning". *Yomiuri* began its shift to the right in the 1980s as the new Editor-in Chief Watanabe Tsuneo, an associate of Prime Minister Nakasone, took more control. (Nakano 2017: 33). The late 1990s saw an escalation of anti-left – "anti-bias" – rhetoric: from right



wing press such as *Sankei* and the *Shuukan Bunshun* magazine, as well as right wing intelligentsia, religious figures, and most of all the new generation of right wing politicians. The brief tenure of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) saw attempts at a change in direction, but illiberalism has grown further after the DPJ lost the general election in 2012. For the first time in post-war Japan, not only were there no believable opposition parties to LDP, but small right wing parties had grown that could support it (ibid. 36).

## **2.4 Problems of the modern media field**

Behind the apparent diversity of the Japanese news industry lie five giant media conglomerates, and the national public broadcaster NHK, which control a majority of the field. The oligarchy of the media means concentration of power, and fewer people in executive positions can make the media field easier for a powerful outsider to manipulate.

The interests of private owners can quell investigative journalism in favour of safe sales, and the owners' personal connections and ideologies can affect company policy (Krauss 1996: 357), as seen with *Yomiuri's* shift under Watanabe. The interests of big advertisers also curb the commercial media. A single advertising agency, Dentsū, is responsible for nearly half of the advertisement spending in the country, Hakuhodō for another 20%, and criticism means loss of revenue (McNeill 2014: 65; Farley 1996: 139). It is also interesting to note that Dentsū handles the publicity for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (McNeill 2017: 166).

The public broadcaster NHK is hardly doing better than its private counterparts. Aurelia George Mulgan (2017: 21) argues that the current NHK tends to act as a government PR organ, subject to what she calls "reverse accountability": the NHK behaves as if it is accountable to politicians, not politicians to it. In Philip Seaton's words the NHK has become a "watched dog" rather than a "watchdog" (2017: 173).

The press has been seen by different scholars (Krauss & Lambert 2002: 2) as either a government lapdog or doing better at being the political opposition than the political opposition is. Since the decades-long dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party has left opposition parties with little leverage (Farley 1996: 133), this statement does not necessarily carry much weight.

Western scholarship is fond of stretching the watchdog metaphor to describe the Japanese media. In addition to Seaton's "watched dog", Krauss (Krauss & Lambert 2002: 3–4) has used

the term guard dog: dutifully hounding criminals once they are found, but not seeking them out. George Mulgan (2017: 21) voices a fear for the mass media as a whole slipping from guard dog to lap dog to "pet dog", the government's loyal publicity agents.

Unlike in the Meiji era, when newspapers feared forced pullbacks and the imprisonment of editors, today's media companies fear lawsuits. Financial penalties imposed on media companies in defamation lawsuits have seen a significant spike in the last twenty years, so avoiding risky topics has become the media's risk management strategy of choice (Kingston 2017: 5). This *jishuku* ('self restraint', McNeill 2014: 66) or *jishu kisei* ('voluntary restraints', George Mulgan 2017: 22), is a polite way to say self-censorship. Repeta and Sawa (2017: 98) agree that Japan's defamation laws make it difficult to write about scandals: they are heavily geared towards protecting privacy and anonymity. The protection of this "anonymous society", where mentioning a name can result in a lawsuit, extends to politicians. As a result, investigative journalists are bogged down by defamation lawsuits where they have the burden of proof to show that their information is strictly factual (ibid.: 93). A related issue is that Japan does not have a law that would require officials to disclose information to the public (Edwards 2001: 218). Officials are also instructed to not give reporters scoops when interviewed and arrange to release the information in a press conference instead. Consequently, exclusive interviews with high profile politicians and officials are rare in Japan.

*Jishuku* also extends to industry-wide silence agreements on special topics, such as any non-official content on the imperial family, and ongoing criminal cases (Freeman 2000: 108). Commercial interest also curbs reporting: the widely circulated newspapers have traditionally aimed for as wide an audience as possible, and stories on topics like *burakumin* or the yakuza have been judged to be commercially nonviable (Farley 1996: 138).

More practical problems curb investigative journalism as well. In *kisha* clubs, in addition to formal club rules governing the release of credentialed information, the amount of data given to them can be so large that the reporters can only sift through it through inter-paper cooperation and have no time to fact check or investigate (Freeman 2000: 75), making them reliant on cooperation between rivals to produce timely releases.

The common practice of writing news articles as an anonymous group effort discourages journalist name-branding, and a traditional promotion system based on seniority rather than merit removes experienced reporters from the field to management positions (Freeman 2000: 20). The Japanese public also has a fairly low opinion on Western-style investigative

journalism. In a 2015 Pew Poll (Pew Research Center 2015; referenced by Kingston 2017: 6), on the subject of "Global Support for Principle of Free Expression, but Opposition to Some Forms of Speech", only 45% of Japanese respondents agreed with the statement "it's very important that the media can report news without censorship in our country". This number is below all surveyed European countries, and 10 percentage points below the global median, although Kingston failed to point out that 41% of Japanese respondents still viewed lack of censorship as "somewhat important", compared to 46% "very important" and 42% "somewhat important" responses in France, so the difference is not as steep as he implied.

While the Broadcast Act explicitly stipulated that the media should be neutral, George Mulgan (2017: 17–18) has noted that the laws give the government the liberty to interpret "fair coverage" to mean "*uncritical* coverage", and label all criticism of the government as unfair bias, as hinted at by Minister Takaichi's statement. Nakano (2017: 38) is in agreement, going as far as to compare the present state of the Japanese press to that of wartime, where the government was free to decide what is fair and impartial, and enforce its opinion as it wished. George Mulgan goes on to suggest (2007: 19, 22) that Prime Minister Abe is particularly sensitive to perceived criticism, especially media criticism, because he faces so little criticism in the Diet: the political opposition is weak, critical factions within his own party virtually non-existent, and coalition partner Kōmeitō rarely expresses criticism.

According to George Mulgan, the "media muzzling" techniques employed by Abe's government include complaining directly to broadcasters; summoning executives to be questioned over their channel's broadcasts; angry objections to political reporters; refusing interviews until the media has apologised for perceived slights; granting exclusive interviews and scoops to favoured newspapers, or inviting journalists and executives to enjoy the prime minister's hospitality. These behaviours are by no means unique to Abe's government or unique to Japan, but George Mulgan argues that in today's Japan they are setting the tone. (2017: 18)

George Mulgan and Nakano have a very negative view of the state of the press in today's Japan, but as a look into the history of the system has shown, the media avoiding potentially risky content is certainly nothing new. Cucek (2017: 77) argues in this line, stating that Abe's conduct as Prime Minister is not particularly out of line with the actions of previous administrations, nor are his powers of persuasion particularly greater than previous premiers. He also questions the accusations of censorship, pointing out that there is "no demonstrable

case of consequences that can be unequivocally attributed to intimidation or threats by the Abe government" (ibid.).

Yamada (2017: 122) is somewhat in line with Cucek in stating that no formal censorship is in place in Abe's Japan, but fears that the recent political developments have instead created a social atmosphere that is intolerant of dissent, making people fearful of divulging information to journalists for fear of prosecution, leading to a much more efficient atmosphere of silence than formal censorship laws ever could. Signs of this can be seen in the RSF World Press Freedom Index, in which Japan's ranking has been uniquely volatile. The country peaked at a shared 11th place out of 178 in 2010 (RSF 2010) and has since declined steeply, culminating in a record low of 72nd in 2016 and 2017, and 66 in the most recent ranking (RSF 2020). The Fukushima disaster in 2011, during which the government severely restricted information and persecuted investigative journalists who attempted to get to the bottom of the incident, was cited as the main catalyst of this downward trend. The controversial SDS Act of 2013, which RSF criticises for its lack of whistle-blower and journalist protection and severe punishments, also still appears as a point of criticism seven years after it was passed.

Cucek (2017: 85–86) questions the scientific validity of the RSF ranking, given that the information is gathered from potentially biased sources such as journalists, and says that the ranking is therefore more a measurement of "media mood swings" than actual developments in press freedom. Looking at the index as an indicator of societal atmosphere surrounding press freedom rather than a scientific ranking, however, still tells a damning tale of the way the sources view Japan's development in the last decade.

Similarly to many other countries in the West and elsewhere, Japan has seen a recent normalisation of formerly extreme ideas and rhetoric. McNeill (2017: 169) argues that Abe didn't start this, but that he tipped the balance. Since his re-election as prime minister in 2012, Abe has repeatedly pushed changes in legislature that have drawn the criticism of domestic and international observers for limiting the civil liberties of Japanese people and particularly the freedom of information in the name of national security. The SDS is one of the most prominent changes; others include the 2015 constitutional reinterpretation to allow Japanese self-defence troops to practice "collective self-defence" overseas and the accompanying "Peace and Security Act", commonly called "security guarantee law" (安保法, *anpo-hō*) in reference to the US–Japan mutual security treaty, which it was seen as being linked to; the APOC, which I will discuss; the 2018 amendment to the Telecommunications Business Act

which allowed the government to access domestic routers and other appliances connected to the internet in an effort to strengthen cybersecurity (*The Asahi* 2.2.2019), which the Freedom House found particularly troubling in their Freedom of the Net survey (Freedom House 2019); and perhaps above all, Abe's plan to greatly revise the Japanese Constitution.

Published in 2012, the LDP's "Draft to reform Japan's constitution" (LDP 2012) makes significant changes to the principles of the constitution. Overall, the shift is away from the universalist approach of the present constitution which emphasises inalienable natural rights and the people as the source of sovereign power, and towards a narrative of Japanese exceptionalism and rights that come with obligations. Particularly, the subordination of freedoms and rights to "public interest and public order" has been criticised for the effect it could have on freedoms of expression, if individuals feared being targeted for "causing a nuisance" (Repeta 2013: 4).

## **2.5 Yomiuri Shimbun and Asahi Shimbun**

While newspaper readership in Japan has declined with the advance of the internet as it has in other countries, Japan still tops the world in newspaper literacy. The big national newspapers, each with their own array of associated magazines and TV channels, still count their daily readership in millions and carry a lot of prestige.

*Yomiuri Shimbun* and *Asahi Shimbun* are the two largest newspapers by circulation not only among Japan's big five, but in the world (Milosevic 2016: 58). It must be noted that the circulation numbers of Japanese newspapers in general are not entirely reflective of actual readership: the numbers reported by the Japan Audit Bureau of Circulations (ABC) are reseller numbers, and thus include copies that never reach the consumer. The distribution numbers have long been inflated by a large amount of these extra papers. Some of them are simply backup for damaged copies, but a significant amount is suspected to be so-called *oshigami* ('push papers'), extra copy that newspaper companies pressure (or "push") the resellers to buy. Of the large papers, *Asahi* and *Mainichi* have both admitted to a considerable difference between the ABC numbers and actual distribution, while *Yomiuri* maintains that sellers have complete control over the number of copies ordered and no such thing as *oshigami* exists. (Media Kokusyo 11.3.2014)

*Yomiuri Shimbun*, which had the largest circulation at 8,793,554 reported copies of the morning national edition in May 2017 (ABC 2017) during the examined period, profiles itself

as conservative and has consistently taken a stance favouring the Liberal Democratic Party and Prime Minister Abe in dividing issues. *Yomiuri* has defended the Japanese government in the so-called "comfort women" issue, opposes denuclearisation, and supports official visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine.

The progressive *Asahi Shimbun* is the second largest newspaper at 6,216,135 reported copies in May 2017 (ibid.). On the political alignment scale, it occupies the furthest left position of the big five national newspapers, though due to the existence of the communist *Shimbun Akahata*, not the furthest of all daily newspapers. *Asahi* was long regarded as the newspaper of choice for liberal intellectuals, but this reputation was damaged in 2014 when two of its great investigative triumphs, the source that raised the "comfort women" issue to national spotlight, and the Yoshida testimony, a shocking report about the Fukushima nuclear disaster, were both proved erroneous in quick succession (CJR 2015). In the Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2018, *Asahi* was ranked lowest and *Yomiuri* highest of the main newspapers in public trust. Trust among those who read the paper was slightly higher overall, and closer together for the two papers, though *Yomiuri* still ranked higher (Reuters 2018: 130).

*Asahi* opposes Yasukuni Shrine visits and constitutional revision, and can be relied on to oppose Prime Minister Abe in key issues. Its animosity with Abe dates back to 2006, when *Asahi* reported that Abe, then a young rising star of the party, had pressured the NHK to censor a TV program on "comfort women". Abe objected to this accusation, and *Asahi* responded to criticism by strengthening its investigative coverage (Fackler 2017: 47).

After the Fukushima disaster in 2011, partially in response to the criticism mainstream newspapers had received for failing to challenge official reports of the initial catastrophe and investigate more thoroughly, *Asahi* promoted its investigative reporting unit in office hierarchy to a full Investigative Reporting Section (hereafter IRS), with a stated aim of watchdog journalism and editorial freedom to build counter-narratives to challenge the official truth without regard for the interests of sources or journalists in other sections. While the IRS was an instant success, winning Japan's top journalism award for two years running for its extensive and continuous Fukushima coverage, it fell from grace only three years later, after the Yoshida testimony on the incident at Fukushima turned into a scandal which forced *Asahi* to retract its dramatic scoop. (ibid. 48–49)

*Asahi* had already had to retract articles the same month, because the source of one of its previous great scoops, Yoshida Seiji<sup>1</sup>, who had come forward in the 1990s with his story of kidnapping Korean women for sex slaves in the Second World War, was proved fraudulent in an internal investigation. While Yoshida Seiji's story had been under suspicion since the 1990s despite other evidence of these "comfort women" piling up, the internal investigation was launched as a preparation against the looming political pressure when it became likely that Abe was headed for another premiership, which happened in 2012 (Fackler 2017: 50).

The combination of two large and public failures within a month made *Asahi* an easy target for the unusually spirited and unified attack it faced from rival daily papers, even fellow liberal *Mainichi Shimbun*. This isolation from their fellow journalists, as well as a dislike of the perceived arrogance of the IRS from within *Asahi* itself, may have contributed to the apparent ease with which *Asahi* folded on the Fukushima issue (Fackler 2017: 52). The articles based on the Yoshida testimony were redacted on September 11th, a formal apology was extended to TEPCO, the nuclear company, and *Asahi* President Kimura, a firm supporter of the IRS, finally resigned as an apology in December. The size and journalistic freedom of the IRS were slashed thereafter.

Prime Minister Abe's involvement in this scandal is interesting. Abe had completed *Asahi's* public humiliation by denouncing it in the Upper House budget committee in October, criticising it for causing "numerous people to feel hurt, sorrow, suffering and outrage" and causing "great damage to Japan's image with its misreporting" (House of Representatives 2014, translation Fackler 2017: 40). Abe's behaviour as a prime minister has been unprecedented in the amount of exclusive interviews he grants to cooperative media, and *Asahi* has been last in line to receive his attention, after sports newspapers and even after some foreign publications.

Notable in this episode are the directness with which the Prime Minister criticised a national newspaper; the readiness with which other large newspapers, even left-wing *Mainichi*, joined him; and the prominent rhetoric of blaming *Asahi* for *tarnishing Japan's honour* by writing critical articles, rather than criticising the lack of factuality of the articles themselves. The chief consequence, on the other hand, was the downfall of the IRS, and with it, the reinstatement of the status quo of Japanese journalism. It will be interesting to see if this scandal in its recent history shows in *Asahi's* handling of the APOC debate.

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<sup>1</sup> unrelated to Yoshida Masao, the source of the "Yoshida testimony"

### 3. Act on the Punishment of Organised Crimes and the debate

A proposed amendment to Act 136 of 1999, the *Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and Control of Crime Proceeds*, was presented to the Lower House of the Japanese Parliament on March 21st 2017. The stated purpose of the proposal, which the government had dubbed the "terrorism preparation crime proposal" (テロ準備罪法案, *terojunbizai hōan*), was to criminalise the participation in a conspiracy to commit certain serious crimes, including those with a terrorist purpose. In his introduction of the proposal, Prime Minister Abe stressed the importance of the proposal as a prerequisite to ratify the United Nations' Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (TOC), which Japan had signed in December 2000 but never ratified. He presented the increased possibilities of international cooperation in investigation and information exchange that would follow from ratification as indispensable for Japan's ability to hold the 2020 Tokyo Olympics without fear of terrorist attacks<sup>i</sup> <sup>ii</sup>.

Due to significant similarities to an earlier proposed amendment to the same law, the opposition and much of the Japanese press began to call the proposal the "anti-conspiracy bill" (共謀罪法案 or 'conspiracy crime proposal', *kyōbōzai hōan*, in Japanese – "anti-conspiracy bill" was the term Joseph Cannataci used in his letter<sup>2</sup>, and I will use it as a translation for 共謀罪法案). The choice between "terrorism preparation crime proposal" and "anti-conspiracy bill" came to be a distinguishing factor in the ensuing public debate, as those who favoured the law's passing used the government's preferred term and those who wished to see it rejected used the name of the previously rejected proposal. To avoid picking a side with my word choice, I have opted to refer to the proposal as APOC, short for its full formal name. Of the two newspapers analysed here, *Asahi* used "anti-conspiracy bill", while *Yomiuri* opted for "terrorism preparation crime proposal".

The original anti-conspiracy bill the opposition was calling back to was introduced and rejected three times during Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichirō's tenure in the early 2000s. These proposals were unconnected to terrorism in content or rhetoric. Each attempt was met with a backlash for what was perceived to be dangerous possibilities of misuse and arbitrarily wide application on ordinary citizens due to open-ended wording and a lack of curtailments against misuse. The main differences between the APOC and the original anti-conspiracy proposals were the government's emphasis on counterterrorism as a key goal of the law; an

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<sup>2</sup> see 3.1 on Cannataci



added limitation that the law would only apply to "terrorist groups or other organized criminal groups" as opposed to the previous "organisations"; and a new requirement in the APOC of "preparatory acts" for the planned crime before prosecution could happen. The LDP emphasised these differences so vigorously that even staunch supporter *Yomiuri* remarked on how noticeable the attitude was<sup>iii</sup>.

In response, the opposition argued that the differences to the old anti-conspiracy bill were superficial, the danger to citizens' privacy was significant, and that the emphasis on counterterrorism was purely an attempt to garner public support. It is certain that counterterrorism was a late addition to the proposal. In the first government memo mentioning the proposal in the previous year it had been referred to as "organised crime preparation crime" (組織犯罪準備罪, *soshikihanzai junbizai*), was later changed into "terrorism and other organised crime preparation crime" (テロ等組織犯罪準備罪, *tero nado soshikihanzai junbizai*) at the suggestion of the Prime Minister's official residence, and only became "terrorism preparation crime" as a contraction in the Ministry of Justice sometime at the beginning of the year<sup>iv</sup>.

As the full text of the amended section is quite short (not counting appendices), I have reproduced it here in full. The translation is from the Japan Federation of Bar Associations' (JFBA) statement on 15.6.2017; to date there is no official translation of the APOC.

*Article 6 : 2(1) Two or more persons who plan, as part of activities of terrorist groups or other organized criminal groups, the commission of criminal acts listed in the following sections by such groups, are subject to the punishment prescribed in each of those sections, if any of them have arranged funds or goods or carried out preliminary inspections of relevant locations pursuant to the plan or other preparatory acts for the purpose of committing the planned criminal acts. An organized criminal group means a group of persons whose common purpose as the basis of organizing the group is to carry out the crimes enumerated in Appendix 3. However, those who surrender prior to executing the crime will have a reduced or exemption from that sentence.*

*1) Crimes listed in Appendix 4, which are punishable by death penalty, indefinite imprisonment, or imprisonment with or without labor for more than 10 years - Imprisonment with or without labor for 5 years or less.*

*2) Crimes listed in Appendix 4, which are punishable by either imprisonment with or without labor for more than 4 years but less than 10 years - Imprisonment with or without labor for 2 years or less.*

The biggest cause for protest comes from the appendix, where – hidden in references to other legislation – the total amount of "serious crimes" subject to this act is 277. Some of these have been pointed out to have a tenuous connection at best to organised crime. The most egregious examples often repeated in news reports are copying music, collecting plants from nature reserves, and sit-in protests against the construction of apartment buildings.

The large number of target crimes combined with the vague definition of "organised crime group" caused an outcry from citizen activists, who feared that under a lax interpretation of the law, activist groups could be targeted as organised criminals for acts such as protesting the building of a power plant, which could constitute forcible obstruction of business, one of the target crimes. Although the government repeatedly declared that in order to be considered an organised crime group, a group would have to be formed for a criminal purpose, and that a citizen organisation, formed for the betterment of society, would not be in the scope of the law, several concerning precedents where the police had treated activists like criminals even under the current law were brought up. Meanwhile, while some police-affiliated commentators welcomed the law, there was also criticism that the added limitations compared to the old anti-conspiracy bill would make it difficult to use due to the double burden of proof placed on the police for both the plan and preparatory action.

The main topics that came to be repeated in the committee debate were the possibility of normal citizens coming under widespread surveillance, which was connected to the possible violation of constitutional freedoms, and criticism of the way the government conducted affairs related to the proposal, which was seen as autocratic.

The discussion in the Diet was characterised by its remarkable speed, and its remarkable lack of content. The amendment was presented to the Diet on March 21st 2017, and passed in the Lower House on May 23rd amid domestic and international protests. To hasten the amendment through the system before the regular Diet session was scheduled to disband in

June, the government bypassed a vote in the Upper House's Committee on Judicial Affairs, utilising an extremely rarely used clause in the parliament rulebook in order to do so. This garnered widespread criticism even from Kōmeitō and Nihon Ishin no Kai, who were in favour of the law, as well as from among LDP itself. Bypassing the vote in the committee brought the proposal under the vote of the full Upper House, where the law was passed on June 15th, less than three months after it was introduced.

Criticisms towards the lack of real progress in the parliamentary discussion were fired from both supporters and opponents of the law. The opposition criticised the government's reluctance or inability to answer their questions in a satisfying manner, and especially concentrated their complaints on the conduct of Justice Minister Kaneda Katsutoshi. Kaneda was formally responsible for presenting the APOC to the parliament and answering questions in the committee, but his understanding of the law was widely considered to be poor. A bureaucrat from the Ministry of Justice was brought into the committee discussion to answer questions, which the opposition took as the government's attempt to cover for Kaneda's lack of ability. The government, meanwhile, criticised the opposition for repeatedly asking the same questions despite having been given answers, and for obstinate resistance for the sake of resistance, which in their view was needlessly delaying an important law for national security.

### **3.1 United Nations criticism of the proposal**

Joseph Cannataci, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, published an open letter addressed to Prime Minister Abe on May 18th, already before the Lower House vote. In his letter, Cannataci expressed "serious concern" that the enactment of the bill in combination with other legislation would infringe on citizens' right to privacy, as well as on other basic rights. As Special Rapporteur on privacy, Cannataci's main concern is about the lack of safeguards against arbitrary surveillance, allowing law enforcement agencies to authorise surveillance at their discretion (Cannataci 2017).

In reaction, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide voiced the government's protest in a press conference on May 22nd, saying that Cannataci had published his letter without giving the Japanese government a chance to explain the legislation, and that the government "strongly protested" the letter's "inappropriate content". On the following day, Justice Minister Kaneda was reported as attempting to devalue Cannataci's criticism by saying he had spoken as an individual and his opinions did not reflect those of the United Nations. (*The*

*Mainichi* 24.5.2017. In *The Japan Times* 23.5.2017, Kaneda's criticism is attributed to Suga instead.)

Cannataci, in turn, maintained that the government's criticism was "angry words with no substance", and pointed out that the Japanese officials had visited the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to protest his letter, and were thus perfectly aware that he had acted in his official capacity (*The Japan Times* 23.5.2017).

Abe brought up the letter when he met United Nations Secretary-General Guterres in Italy at the end of May, and reported upon his return that Guterres had said Cannataci was not a formal United Nations representative, but was "operating on his own merits"<sup>v</sup>. The Secretary-General's office, in response, published a note saying that Guterres had told Abe that "Special Rapporteurs are experts that are independent and report directly to the Human Rights Council" (UN 2017). When the opposition brought up this contradiction in the Diet, Cabinet Secretary Suga only replied that the government's report had been correct.

While the opposing media were quick to refer to Cannataci's letter as proof that the proposal should be rejected, in the Diet discussion it was primarily touched upon when the opposition criticised the government's response to it, not regarding its contents.

## 4 Theoretical framework

In this chapter I will outline the theoretical base of my thesis, drawing from both framing analysis and different schools of critical content analysis. Roger Fowler's critical news analysis illustrates the philosophical starting point of how I view the nature of news and the journalists that construct them, as well as how I view the nature of the researcher. On this base, I build from framing theory, drawing in particular from the work of Robert Entman and Baldwin van Gorp.

### 4.1 Newsmaking and the role of the journalist

Constructivist media theory holds that language is never neutral, but inherently coloured by the speaker's perceptions and opinions. This is in contrast to the traditional journalist ethos, which maintains that in a newspaper, the editorials are the paper's opinion, while the rest of the reporting is neutrally presented fact (Fowler 1991: 1). Fowler in *Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the Press* maintains that news do not "happen": they are made. Facts only become news after they are selected for inclusion. This selection of topics and the consequent transformation of facts for the journalist's medium is guided by generally subconscious reference to ideas and beliefs (ibid.: 2). Ellis Krauss argued similarly that the subjective understanding of reality is compounded by a journalist's professional bias of what is objective, what is noteworthy, and what is news (Krauss 1996a: 244).

Entman (2010: 393–394) calls this selection process the journalist's **decision-making bias**, noting that although journalists may deny any bias in their work, every individual and organisation that processes information must, by necessity, employ short-cut decision rules. Scheufele & Scheufele (2010: 112), who use the term cognitive bias, argue that all individuals, journalists included, are more likely to focus on information or events that align with their existing perception of the world.

Bias in the sense that Entman, Scheufele and Scheufele employ it here should be separated from the idea of deliberate and malicious distortion of facts. A decision-making bias is simply the human mind at work. In Fowler's words, "because the institutions of news reporting are socially, economically and politically situated, all news is always reported from some particular angle" (1991: 10).

Entman divides bias into decision-making bias and **content bias**. The latter he separates

further from **slant**. These resemble more the common language definition of bias in the news: in Entman's terms, slant is similar to what Fowler terms a skewed representation (1991: 12), and appears where a news report emphasises one side's preferred angle while ignoring or derogating another side's. Slant can be deliberate, or appear without the reporter's conscious choice to favour a side if one of the sources available delivers their message significantly more skilfully or persistently than the other. If a slant in media holds up consistently over time, Entman deems it a content bias. (Entman 2010: 392–393)

Not even a content bias needs a deliberate decision to distort the facts behind it: it can result from journalists' decision-making biases. In addition to sometimes subconscious mental and ideological biases, two notable decision-making biases must be mentioned: the capitalist concern of what is going to sell most copies and get the most subscribers (Entman 2010: 393, Lawrence 2010: 265), and the press' prized watchdog mentality, which emphasizes the newsworthiness of exposing wrongdoings by authority. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the watchdog mentality is a lesser concern to the Japanese press than it is in the West. Lawrence also notes that journalists can look for a contrarian angle on purpose, purely for the sake of objectivity (ibid.).

The capitalist bias and Krauss's newsworthiness bias work together to cause the news media to perpetuate whichever status quo is in effect: if news from a particular source sells, it must mean the readership thinks it's important, which means it must be reported again. Fowler notes that access to the media is reciprocal: people that give the media access to the content it wants to publish can trust they will have access to publicity for the content they want to broadcast. Imbalance in this access leads to partiality not only in what assertions and attitudes are reported but also how they are reported (Fowler 1991: 22). Even if the media were not intending it, choices in language can undermine the attempted angle. In Japan, the rigid structure of the press and its reliance on credentialed fact in reporting makes it particularly vulnerable to this.

In this work, I will use Entman's definitions of decision-making bias, content bias and slant to examine the objectivity of my material. Where the word bias appears without a modifier, it refers to content bias.

## 4.2 Frame and reality

There are almost as many definitions for the term **frame** as there are applications of framing theory. As a wide and somewhat loosely defined field, framing research has focused on everything from the deliberate publicity spinning of political actors to deep concepts resonating in the consciousness of a culture. Both of the former are factors that will influence a journalist at their work – however, they are not in themselves the focus of this thesis.

In a widely quoted definition, Entman (1993: 52) defined framing as selecting "some aspects of a perceived reality and [making] them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation." Entman also identifies four distinct locations where framing takes place: the communicator's judgment of what to say; the text itself, where frames manifest by the presence or absence of culturally recognisable triggers; the receiver's interpretation of the text influenced by their own schemata of frame recognition; and finally the culture, as the hive mind collection of recognisable frames (ibid.). In contrast, Nisbet (2010: 47) defines frame as one of three things: an interpretive schema used by audience to make sense of a topic; a way for journalists to condense complex topics into a digestible form; or a way for policy makers to define options and reach decisions, thus omitting Entman's text and culture and separating his communicator into journalists and politicians. This last category approaches Brewer and Gross's (2010: 159) concept of **partisan frame**, employed to "highlight certain information and ideas in order to present one position (or set of positions) as correct and all other positions as being wrong" typically by those seeking to coax the receiver's opinion behind their preferred policy.

Nisbet and Entman are in accord that framing gives greater importance to certain aspects of a topic at the expense of others, and in this process defines why something is an issue, who is responsible, and what should be done (Nisbet 2010: 47, referring to Entman 1993 among others). As humans tend to resist information that clashes with their existing opinions, this definition is most efficient when it resonates with the audience's existing perceptions and values (Nisbet 2010: 47). Failing to accurately convey "conventional wisdom" about a topic leads to the risk of losing public trust (ibid. 45) and thus a paying audience. While most people will not be swayed from their views by a news story, Entman (2010: 392) argues that the key targets of political framing are firstly people with no strong convictions on the topic

who may be swayed, and secondly other political elites, who have the actual decision making power.

The crucial difference between Entman's and Nisbet's frame definitions is the location of the frame: for Nisbet the frame *is* a schema in the mind; for Entman the frame is *interpreted* through a schema in the mind, and the frame itself resides in the cultural consciousness. Van Gorp, whose work on framing research (van Gorp 2005, 2010) forms the core of the method I will apply, takes the latter view, and for the sake of consistency I will follow.

Van Gorp (2010: 87 and elsewhere) has noted on the appeal of **culturally embedded frames** to journalists, as they are ready narrative ingredients that the audience is likely to recognise. While all human interaction necessarily happens against a cultural backdrop, culturally embedded frames are distinct from issue-specific frames and generic news frames in their utilisation of cultural archetypes or shared experiences. For example, while 'conflict' may be a generic frame, 'conflict of good and evil' will have culturally differing specifics and archetypes and is therefore a culturally embedded frame. 'Policy conflict' would be an example of an issue-specific frame in the same vein. Regardless of issue specificity, a frame must be abstract enough to be applicable to multiple source texts to function as a research tool.

In van Gorp's method, the distinction of frame as a cultural structure triggered in the receiver's consciousness and **framing device** and **reasoning device**, which are present in the text, is central. These devices operate as cues from the sender to the receiver to construct a particular frame for the occurrence described (van Gorp 2005: 486). Framing devices are the textual indicators that evoke a frame: themes, metaphors, stereotypes, lexical choices, myths, narratives, contrasts, appeals to emotion or logic, as well as supralinguistic features such as source selection, statistics, graphics and images. What van Gorp has termed reasoning devices, on the other hand, are Entman's four functions of framing: defining a problem, assigning responsibility, casting moral judgment and suggesting solutions. Reasoning devices may manifest explicitly in the text or be evoked circumventively by the choice of framing devices, but any of the four functions may also be missing entirely. (van Gorp 2005: 487, 2010: 85–86, 94)

Almost as central to the function of a frame as what it adds salience to, is what it erases. We do not easily notice when we're *not* being told something (Kuypers 2010: 300), and thus utilising this lack of attention to negative space is an effective way for partisan actors to direct opinion (Entman 1993: 54). If framing requires selecting some aspects for increased salience,



other aspects must in turn be selected for exclusion. In a discussion dominated by one frame, aspects this frame excludes will disappear from the discussion, and stray contrary opinions, where they break the glass ceiling of attention, will have low salience (Kuypers 2010: 301). Frames can also be codominant, when contrary opinions appear in equal or near-equal measure, either within the same articles or alternating in a newspaper's coverage. Codominant frames can also support each other, while being distinct enough in their devices that labelling them a part of the same frame is not adequate.

In this work, I am examining only the frames apparent in newspaper output, and specifically the differences between two politically opposite newspapers which are basing their coverage largely on identical sources. What sources do *Yomiuri* and *Asahi* choose to include? How do they portray the sources they include? To distinguish between devices introduced by partisan sources such as quotes from politicians, and devices introduced by journalists themselves, I am employing **partisan frame** and **journalist frame** as separate categories.

#### 4.3 Critical discourse analysis

In addition to framing analysis, I will further analyse some salient features of the texts in a comparative critical discourse analysis. The primary theorists whose work I will base my analysis on are Fairclough (1989, 1995), and Fowler (1991), who partitions the analysis of news reports as a discourse category specifically into critical news analysis.

Fairclough (1995: 17) defines **discourse** as "language as social practice determined by social structures". Fowler, meanwhile, describes news in specific as a discourse which is far from a neutral reflection of fact, but intervenes in the social construction of reality (1991: 2. Fowler borrows the term 'social construction of reality' from Berger and Luckmann's 1976 book by the same name.)

**Lexical choice** is a powerful factor in frame building and a key target of analysis. The terms chosen to refer to the central actors or concepts of a situation can, with negative or positive connotations, determine the frame that the text presents so cogently that even the inclusion of several devices of an opposing frame will not change it. Of particular interest is the inclusion of what I have termed **words of power**: concepts of such emotional or cultural resonance that evoking them inevitably garners a strong reaction from the receiver. For this, Fairclough's concept of the **experiential value** of words will come in useful. One of the aspects of experiential value he describes is "how ideological differences between texts in their

representations of the world are coded in their vocabulary" (Fairclough 1989: 112). This is exactly the feature I wish to examine.

In addition to terminological choice, ideological differences can be visible in the verbs chosen to describe words or actions. Fowler (1991: 230–231) specifically notes the importance of examining reporting verbs used in reporting authority: "critical analysis should pay particular attention to how what people say is transformed." He (ibid. 128) also remarks on the use of impersonality as a significant style choice: impersonalising people by encoding them in the abstract will distance the reader from them emotionally. In Fowler's example of a newspaper article discussing medical files, patients are referred to in consistently depersonalising and agency-stripping ways ('patient', 'case'), while doctors and politicians are referred to by name or professional title. This is a concrete example how the choice of language can undermine the attempted angle: you cannot defend the little man using the big man's vocabulary (ibid. 23).

Closely connected to lexical choice, **voice** is an important concept to examine when determining writer sympathies. Voice refers to the choice of who gets to speak, whose words are selected for inclusion in a text and whose words are reported in a positive or negative light, as well as which side is grammatically presented as the active agent of a sentence or text (Fang 2001: 601). Voice and lexical choice intertwine into **credence**, examining not only who gets to speak, but how much weight is put on their credibility as a source.

Voice and word choice are both examples of the use of **marked** or **unmarked** formulation. Ensink and Sauer refer to Mikame Hirofumi (1996), who argued that choosing an unmarked formulation such as an active sentence is the default state, and communicatively salient marked formulations (like passive) can be opted for when the speaker wants to signal that another perspective is more important than the subject's. (Ensink and Sauer 2003: 10–11<sup>3</sup>)

Cornelis has presented a similar case of analysing the grammatical agency of a text to determine writer sympathies. According to Cornelis "empathy is expressed -- through the selection of a particular entity in the subject role" (2003: 172). Active voice is the unmarked presentation, and conversely if the passive is used, there is a marked effort to deter reader

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<sup>3</sup> The article that Ensink and Sauer refer to is Mikame, Hirofumi 1996: "Markierte Perspektive, perspektivische Annäherung des Sprechers an das Objekt und direkte Wahrnehmung. Zur Signalisierung der psychischkognitiven Nähe des Sprechers zum Objekt", published in *Sprachwissenschaft*, 21, 367–420. As this article is in German, which I do not speak, I am basing my reference on Ensink and Sauer.

identification with the sentence's actor. Cornelis used a manufactured sports reporting data set to prove that readers were able to identify which "news article" was written by which imaginary football team's hometown paper.

Another interesting point for grammatical analysis is what Fairclough (1995: 4–5) calls hedging and modalising: modal adverbs (eg. *probably*, *maybe*), as well as the choice of presenting a statement as either qualified (eg. *it will happen*) or categorical (eg. *it could happen*). To further distance the writer from responsibility, a writer can modalise by presenting a statement with a qualifier such as "critics say" or "there have been concerns that" to "mitigate and disclaim responsibility for a damning judgment" (ibid. 5). Fang has also noted on this, saying that "by giving voice to an undefined anonymous group --, the newspaper gives the impression that this belief is widespread, leaving the reader with little means of verifying the accuracy of the statement" (Fang 2001: 610).

## 5. Method and research design

Just as the journalist cannot avoid their existing beliefs subconsciously affecting the news they produce, it is also impossible for the researcher to be a perfectly neutral outsider. As I have taken the view that framing partially takes place in the receiver's mind, with the message interpreted through each person's own cultural schemata, I must acknowledge that my own mind inevitably affects the results I get as a researcher. The difficulty of balancing cultural recognisability to the Japanese and outsider view must be considered – a frame may be more easily viewable from the outside, when one is not steeped in it, but I must take care to not impose Western frames on Japan. To combat this reality as well as I am able, the research method described in this chapter has been chosen for its explicit attempt to minimise the effect of subjectivity on a framing study, although the lack of a corps of research assistants has forced me to modify van Gorp's method from its ideal condition.

### 5.1 Hybrid framing analysis

My framing analysis will be based on the method presented by van Gorp (2005, 2010). In these works, he outlines a method specifically designed to minimise the effect of researcher subjectivity on framing analysis. Van Gorp notes that a framing analysis that concentrates too much on reliability checks, such as counting catchwords as framing devices, to produce an absolutely repeatable quantitative result, runs the risk of missing the frame evident in less overt devices (2005: 488, 2010: 99). Since framing takes place in the mind, interpretation must happen to examine it.

Van Gorp's method includes an **inductive** framing analysis, where "the spectrum of conceivable frames that are relevant for the topic under scrutiny is identified" (van Gorp 2010: 91) without a predetermined set of frames, and then a **deductive** analysis, where the set of framing devices obtained in the inductive analysis is then tested against a target dataset and the objective is to examine to what extent the previously identified frames occur. In the pure form of the method, which van Gorp demonstrates in his 2005 article, the inductive analysis is performed on a collection of separate sources representative of the societal discourse surrounding a particular topic, and a deductive analysis then performed on a newspaper corpus. This results in an extensive look into how various newspapers reflect issue discourse, and which partisan frames they reproduce.

My aim differs slightly from this, in that the newspaper reporting of an issue active in parliament already includes the primary sources of partisan frames. Rather than examining the newspaper reproduction of frames extant in society, my interest is in examining how they convey partisan frames as they are produced, and how, if at all, they question them. For this reason I have chosen to perform the inductive analysis on my target newspaper material, categorising the origins of each framing and reasoning device separately.

In van Gorp's method, the inductive analysis is further divided into three processes: **open, axial and selective coding**. These processes are iterative rather than sequential, meaning repeated examination of the source material is necessary as new connections become evident. Open coding is the analysis of texts without a predefined strategy, noting the features of language and thematic choice which may influence the reader's interpretation – the concrete language which indicates possible framing and reasoning devices. Axial coding is the organisation of these findings into groups centred around meanings, looking for patterns, connections and overarching ideas. Axial coding is the first step away from the level of each individual text, linking instances to find devices. In this stage, knowledge of cultural context becomes crucial. The final stage, selective coding, sorts out the tentative framing and reasoning devices into a **frame matrix**, where each column represents a framing and reasoning device, and each row the complete **frame package** that makes up the frame. In this stage, some features of the axial coding will be left out, and open coding may need to be repeated as cells of the frame matrix remain unfilled. (van Gorp 2010: 93–96)

I will perform this sequence of coding processes on a newspaper dataset introduced in chapter 5.4.

The second stage, deductive analysis, is then performed according to the principles of quantitative content analysis. Most of the deductive analysis as van Gorp presents it is inseparably reliant on the work of coders who were not involved in the inductive analysis, and as such I have been forced to deviate from the model as it was presented. Van Gorp recommends two coders who both go through the entire material independently for the most reliability. Working alone, I had wanted to run my material through the deductive phase twice instead, and compare the two results to maximise reliability, but due to time constraint and the large amount of data this proved undoable.

Van Gorp names the construction of a **codebook** as the first step of the deductive stage. The codebook should, according to him, comprise of simple questions designed to capture the core

idea behind the frame, and not necessarily every single framing device, and be phrased in such a way as to minimise the coders' need to interpret the material, ideally with yes/no questions. The codebook should further be presented not as grouped according to frame package, but in such a way as to minimise the possibility of coders conjecturing frame packages and adjusting their answers to match. The coders' results would then be run through a series of statistical analyses to determine if the frame packages that were the end result of the inductive analysis were accurate, and to what extent they occurred. (van Gorp 2010: 99–102)

As my knowledge of the results of the inductive analysis is naturally comprehensive, I have instead chosen to perform the quantitative analysis on each framing device, and benefit from the chance to compare their relative frequency, weight, and collocation. As the deductive analysis performed in this way will primarily quantify the results of the inductive analysis, I hesitate to call it a full deductive analysis, preferring to call the whole a hybrid analysis that takes features of both the stages of van Gorp's method. I applied the codebook portion of the method to minimise the risk of deviating midway and falling into an endless cycle of adjustment and addition. My codebook is included in **Appendix A** of this thesis to facilitate the repeatability of this study.

As a result of these differences in the deductive phase, my analysis will not answer the question "which partisan frames are reflected in which newspaper, and how clearly?", as van Gorp's does, but instead "to what extent does each newspaper reflect each frame, and what means do they use to achieve that?"

## **5.2 Qualitative analysis of distinguishing features**

The downside of van Gorp's method as I'm applying it is that different instances of a framing device will inevitably carry different amounts of frame evoking power – such as different word choices that both evoke the same feeling but to a different degree – yet will be counted as equal in a quantitative analysis only concerned with tallying instances. To supplement the downsides of a fundamentally quantitative primary method, I will also examine some key points of difference in a more qualitative analysis.

The primary thing I want to analyse is what lexical and grammatical features characterise the main points of difference between *Asahi* and *Yomiuri*. For this, I will utilise some features of Fairclough's **three-stage critical discourse analysis** (outlined in 1989: 109–111). Primarily

this analysis will be concerned with the **description** stage, based on the results of the framing analysis but also remarking on devices that point to other frames than the dominant ones chosen for deductive analysis. The questions I ask of the text are based on those Fairclough outlines in chapter 6 of 1989.

- 1) What experiential values do words have? In particular, are there words which are ideologically contested?
- 2) What relational values do words have?
- 3) What experiential values do grammatical features have?
- 4) What relational values do grammatical features have?

The **interpretation** and **explanation** stages of Fairclough's method are remarkably similar in philosophy to the interpretive stages of framing analysis. As Entman and van Gorp stress the similarity of the researcher's and the original recipient's processing of the framing devices, so does Fairclough stress the similarity of what the analyst and the discourse participants do in terms of interpretation. Interpretation is an interplay of the cues in the text and the interpreter's resources, that is, the knowledge of the situation and background that they have (Fairclough 1989: 141). In this sense it is very close to the understanding of culturally embedded frames. The explanation stage, meanwhile, is primarily concerned with examining discourse as part of a social structure, analysing the ways discourses sustain or change the interpreter's understanding, and that in turn sustains or changes social structure (ibid. 163).

Due to this similarity, I will not implement the latter two stages to their full extent. Since the latter stages of Fairclough's method so resemble the process of a framing analysis, using its first stage to explicate the linguistic instances behind the frames is a good fit, but especially worked in close connection with a framing analysis, the results of an interpretive discourse analysis would likely only mirror those of the preceding framing analysis. I will employ interpretive features in analysing the devices I have described, and draw explanations based on the combined results of the description and the framing analysis, but doing an in-depth critical discourse analysis back-to-back with a framing analysis is neither feasible nor meaningful.

### 5.3 Aim and hypothesis

The object of the study is to examine how reporting reflects the political alignment of newspapers in a conservative political climate, to identify the main frames they transmit to

their readers, and to describe these frames, with attention to the extent their origin is partisan or journalist. It will be interesting to see whether the worries for the declining state of Japan's press freedom reflect in the results, and how the watchdog mentality comes up in the coverage, concerning both its historical lack of significance and the *Asahi* investigative reporting section's recent fall from grace.

Based on the newspapers' stated alignments and reporting history, it is presupposed that *Yomiuri* will support the government's angle, and *Asahi* will oppose it. The interest lies in the nature of the frames they utilise to do this. My hypothesis based on the parliament discussion is that the main competing frames will be a security frame, emphasising the threat of terrorism to the Japanese people, and a civil freedoms frame, emphasising the threat of widespread surveillance. What non-dominating frames appear will likely be used to support these two. Further, I postulate that for both newspapers the uncritical transmitting of partisan frames from the parliament will occupy the majority of the coverage, signifying a lack of investigative reporting. *Asahi* will likely also report the popular protests opposing the law, and do so in a positive, heroic light, but *Yomiuri* may omit coverage of anti-government activism entirely.

## **5.4 Data**

The newspaper data was obtained from both newspapers' online article databases. The examined period is from March 22nd 2017, the day after the proposal was introduced in the Lower House, to June 16th, the day after the law was passed. The one-day offset is due to newspaper printing schedule. While I chose this time period specifically to examine the transmission of the parliament discussion, the proposal's existence, though not its precise contents, was known since at least the previous year, and *Asahi* ran a near-weekly series of focus articles on it since February. Therefore, the beginning of the examined period is not the beginning of the discussion.

For the sake of both consistency within the results and comparability between the two newspapers, I limited the search to the morning Tokyo editions, which have the widest circulation among both newspapers' various editions. Editorials and reader letters are included in the material, but transcripts of parliament discussions, which both newspapers printed following major developments, are omitted since as word-for-word transmissions of politicians' words they would not have brought anything new to the material. While it could



be argued that reader letters and interviews similarly transmit partisan frames word-for-word and therefore tell nothing of the newspaper's own framing, it must be remembered that interviewees and letters to the editor are always chosen for inclusion, and this choice carries an agenda-setting power too great to ignore. Search results were counted as separate articles if they appeared as such in the database, despite some entries in both newspapers appearing on the same page of the physical paper.

To account for the two different names used to refer to the law, I ran the search as a Boolean OR search for the terms 共謀罪+法 (*kyōbōzai*, 'criminal conspiracy', + *hō*, 'law'), and テロ準備罪 (*terojunbizai*, 'terrorism preparation crime'), including some variant spellings for the latter<sup>4</sup>. With these parameters, the *Asahi* database returned 278 articles, and the *Yomiuri* database 120 articles. Due to the large number of items, I excluded articles that mention the proposal while being primarily on another topic. The majority of these mentions were simply recounting the remaining agenda of the current parliament session. This exclusion is unfortunate, but necessary to prune excess data items which would not provide content for the qualitative analysis.

With this added condition, the number of articles became 219 from *Asahi*, and 97 from *Yomiuri*. These are the articles I will examine for the framing analysis. Due to the large number of articles, the aim is not to make an in-depth qualitative analysis of all of them, but regard the majority as mass data for the quantitative review and raise examples of key differences into the qualitative inquiry.

Already interesting is the clear divide in the primary terms used by the two newspapers. *Yomiuri's* coverage included 19 articles which mentioned the word *kyōbōzai* – and out of these, only two did not additionally mention *terojunbizai*. Meanwhile, *Asahi* only mentions the term *terojunbizai* in two articles, one of which is an article about this exact difference. According to the *Asahi* article<sup>vi</sup>, among the big five national newspapers, *Yomiuri* and *Sankei Shimbun* used *terojunbizai*, while *Asahi*, *Mainichi Shimbun* and the economic *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* opted for *kyōbōzai*. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* profiles itself as centre-right conservative, but otherwise these choices reflect the political left–right divide.

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<sup>4</sup> For the sake of clarity, I will refer to all variant spellings of テロ準備罪 with this term.

In the next chapter, I will further introduce the data as I present the results of the inductive framing analysis.

## **6. Inductive framing analysis**

In this chapter I will describe first the process, then the results of the inductive framing analysis performed according to van Gorp's method, presenting and describing the frame matrix.

### **6.1 The coding process**

The first stage of analysis to complete was open coding. I went through the texts, looking for words, structures, themes, archetypes, any linguistic and thematic instances that suggested an attempt to influence the reader's interpretation. At this stage I deliberately dismissed any notion of identifying the underlying frames, to avoid skewing my analysis. In order to achieve this, I went through the coverage day by day, rather than paper by paper, to avoid getting caught in a single narrative. I also did not differentiate between the journalist and various partisan frames, instead marking down everything indiscriminately. The amount of possible devices varied greatly from article to article, but there were only stray short news notices where I could not find evidence of an angle.

As I worked through the material, I also marked down the length and type of articles. The article category classification I arrived upon was: news, focus, opinion, interview, and editorial. 'News' covers all articles where the primary topic was the reporting of a new development; 'focus' articles are ones that concerned the APOC itself in an examining or explaining capacity, without a link to any specific news story; 'opinion' pieces are reader-submitted content, plentiful in especially *Asahi's* coverage and overall more varied in their angles than the paper's other output. 'Interview' straddles the line between the last two, with experts of various fields giving their opinions on the subject. These were uniformly presented as direct quotation from the interviewee, without interjection from the newspaper. Lastly, 'editorial' covers leading editorials but also journalist comment columns and similar pieces that present the newspaper staff's direct opinions.

After this, the next stage was the axial coding. Going through the open coding material, I separated the individual instances from the texts, clouding them together to link features and find the underlying patterns. As hypothesised, two distinct clouds of meaning began to form:

devices linked to the government's proposed angle of national security and terrorism, and in contrast devices linked to the opposition's angle of threat to civil freedoms. However, a third major centre also became evident: devices that described the attitude and motives of the involved politicians, without reference to the law itself.

This third cloud of devices was clearly divided into pro- and anti-government sentiment. It was at the same time distinct from the freedom–security dichotomy and yet irrevocably linked to it, since the ways in which politicians and parties are described affects the receiver's understanding of their competence and therefore the validity of their arguments. The high number of devices describing the political strife surrounding the law, rather than strictly the law itself, presented a substantial difficulty in the selective coding phase.

## **6.2 Political strife as a linked factor in the selective coding**

Although freedom and security appeared as the primary frames used to portray the APOC itself, that was far from the whole conversation. Alongside the debate centring on the law's contents, necessity and possible consequences, the politicians' conduct during the debate received constant attention, with the newspapers clearly split between whose actions they view as rightful. Description of political strife in the parliament, picking sides and vehemently advocating for them, takes up a significant part of the total coverage.

The amount of attention paid to political strife rather than content gave me difficulty in formulating the frames. As the political conflict clearly follows the same line as the freedom–security divide, with the government pushing a security angle and the opposition pushing a freedom angle, descriptions of the parliament discussion become inseparable from the framing of the law itself: the way in which the newspapers talk about the discussion colours the topic itself. Due to the clearly opposing angles of opposition and government, description of the conflict overlaps with the security and freedom frames where strife is portrayed as a problem interfering with the rightful goal. Moreover, for the civil liberties camp, criticism of the government is linked to the fear of putting such a law into the hands of a government perceived as autocratic and oppressive. On the other side of the divide, emphasis on the unruly behaviour of the opposition devalues their arguments and portrays them as obstinate and ignorable.

The description of the discussion therefore appears as an important part of the framing of the law. But does the portrayal of political strife belong in the freedom–security matrix? To test

this, I attempted to matrix the devices referring to the political process and strife separately from the freedom–security devices. However, for reasons detailed in the previous paragraph, it proved difficult to separate the debate from the content, and the longer I tried, the more I felt this separation was artificial and would harm the results of the analysis. The divide between support for and distrust of Abe Shinzō runs much deeper in the two newspapers than the coverage of this single law debate, and if my aim were to examine the portrayal of him and his government in general, the devices here could certainly be placed into a matrix centred on that issue. However, as the competence and trustworthiness of the authorities is intrinsically important to the primary debate of the law's contents, I have chosen to place the political strife devices into the freedom–security matrix.

The modifications I have made into the van Gorp method come in useful for this. With my data, it is possible to analyse the frequency of each framing device and clearly quantify the most predominant ones. This is especially interesting for *Yomiuri's* coverage: much of *Asahi's* criticism of the government falls securely under the umbrella of civil freedoms and fear of the government curtailing them, but *Yomiuri's* concentration on political strife is more difficult to clearly link to the security frame. Before the definitive results of the quantitative analysis it is uncertain whether the security frame is truly the dominant one in *Yomiuri's* coverage, or whether it is more accurate to re-categorise the devices into a security frame and a codominant political strife frame.

### 6.3 Frame matrix and representative framing devices

**Table 1** (on the following page) presents the devices that best represent the security frame and the freedom frame as they were invoked in this material. These are the devices that I will analyse in the next chapter, with particular attention to the embedded political strife devices. In particular it is the reasoning devices, those concerning the identification and solution of problems, which centre on the conduct of politicians.

	<i>Freedom frame</i>	<i>Security frame</i>
<b>Reason for the law</b>	increasing surveillance; making it harder to oppose the government	counter-terrorism; signing the TOC treaty
<b>Consequences of the law</b>	human rights limitations; surveillance society; constitution infringement	better investigation; better safety; possible to hold the Olympics
<b>Problem definition</b>	vague criteria; possibility of arbitrary investigation; possibility of ordinary people being targeted; expansion of target crimes; law unrelated to terrorism	danger of terrorist attack; danger of other organised crime; insufficiency of the current law; opposition's repetitive arguments
<b>Problem source</b>	inconsistency of government arguments; authoritarian behaviour of government; apathetic citizens	misinformed opposition politicians and citizens; opposition's irresponsibility
<b>Possible solutions</b>	careful consideration; popular protest; rejecting proposal to try again better; cooperation with Cannataci	government must explain the law carefully; government must make sure law is implemented shortly; opposition must stop stalling
<b>Comparison</b>	Peace Preservation Act; similarity to old Anti-conspiracy bill; other signatories did not make new laws	difference from old Anti-conspiracy bill; other signatories have stricter laws
<b>Metaphor, stereotype</b>	stereotype: Abe as the despotic ruler; LDP as "yes-men"	stereotype: opposition as the small-minded contrarian
<b>Appeal to emotion</b>	fear of being invaded, being watched; shame of needing to be corrected by outsiders	fear for personal safety; shame of not being up to standard
<b>Moral duty</b>	of government to protect citizens' rights; of Japan to comply with international human rights; of press to watch those in power; of politicians to make meaningful debate	of government to protect citizens' lives and public order; of Japan to ratify international treaty and cooperate in international investigation
<b>Sources</b>	opposition politicians; demonstrators and citizen activists; intelligentsia	government politicians; police
<b>Lexical choices</b>	"fundamental human rights"; "arbitrary application"; "withering" of civil society; Terminology: "Anti-Conspiracy Act", "steamroller voting"; "threat to democracy"; "death of the parliament"	"indispensable" for treaty ratification and Olympics; opposition "fearmongering" and "irresponsibility"; Terminology: "Terrorism preparation crime"
<b>Visuals</b>	protesters, particularly at night	disorder in the parliament; shadowy figures as threat, explosions

**Table 1.** Representative framing and reasoning devices for dominant frames in the APOC discussion

The devices of the freedom frame place the government as the major threat, and authoritarian or simply incompetent conduct of the authorities as the central problem. In contrast, the big threat of the security frame is international terrorism, and the problem lies in the irresponsibility of opposition parties and a lack of accurate information. Interestingly, the frames have significant similarities despite being opposite: from the matrix it is already evident that they both hold the protection of society as a primary goal. The great difference lies in whether they consider the danger to be protected against to be a violent threat, or a social change under an authoritative government. Both sides also invoke the same emotions in response to the APOC: fear and shame. In both frames, shame is linked to the reaction of the international community, and thus to Japanese national pride. Both sides also frequently ground their reasoning in a moral duty, although the precise duties invoked differ greatly.

In the shape that they occur, I define the freedom and security frames as culturally embedded frames. Although freedom and security as concepts are universal, the devices apparent in the text link both very distinctly into a Japanese context. For the freedom frame, the national trauma of wartime censorship and the importance of the post-war constitution give rise to many of the central arguments, most clearly the comparison to the wartime Peace Preservation Act and the frequent reference to fundamental human rights. Direct criticisms of the law as unconstitutional were also present in the material, but these did not appear frequently enough to be included as a representative device.

For the security frame, the insulation of the Japanese society against an outside threat and a duty to fulfil expectations run as a clear culturally specific narrative. The security frame, influenced by Abe's rhetoric, is much concerned with the security of the Olympics, and the ratification of the TOC treaty. These are presented not only as a question of personal security, but also as a duty placed on Japan by the international community, and a matter of national pride to uphold.

For both frames, the devices discussing the political debate are by both in context and content deeply linked to the long LDP dominance of Japanese politics, the difficulties of the opposition parties, the historical revisionism movement attempting to change the way Japan's wartime actions are viewed, and Abe's campaign for the constitution amendment. As such they provide deep insight into Japan's particular political situation, but are hardly transplantable to any other context.

## 7. Quantitative representations and analysis

In this chapter, I will present the results of the quantitative analysis, covering the size and spread of the coverage in both newspapers, the presented frames, and finally the most salient devices for each frame and each newspaper, with the understanding that not every instance of referring to something is a framing device: for example, the duty to uphold international law comes up in contexts unrelated to the security frame. To calculate the salience of each frame in the text, I have counted the number of times each framing device occurs in an article. An expression that uses two devices is tallied in both. Recurring examples of this are the hijack of a plane carrying Olympics guests, evoking both the APOC's professed importance for counterterrorism and specifically for the Tokyo Olympics, and the tendency of politicians to combine references to human rights violation and constitution infringement into the same statement.

The frame-making status of a negation became a question here. As a principle, I have counted the framing devices in statements by politicians and other actors with the opposing viewpoint from the article's primary one, unless the article proceeds to dispute them in the immediate context. Disputing one frame furthermore does not by itself count as invoking the opposing frame. Where a statement with one frame is immediately called to question with an opposing frame, I have only counted the latter.

Some articles in both newspapers displayed no evidence of a frame being activated. These are most often short news notices or list-like descriptions of poll results. I have discarded them from further analysis. In *Yomiuri*, the number of disregarded articles is nine, and the final count of articles in the analysis is 88. In *Asahi*, there are 13 frameless articles, and 202 articles remain for the analysis.

### 7.1 Size and distribution of the coverage

With the discarding of the frameless articles, the difference between the size of *Asahi's* and *Yomiuri's* coverage gets even more drastic: *Asahi* devotes more than double the space that *Yomiuri* gives to the APOC. The size of the newspapers themselves is equal, so this is not a question of coverage being simply proportional to total size.

As well as having a much larger coverage, *Asahi's* articles are significantly more varied. **Table 2** shows the total counts of each of the five article types, as well as their median length

(in characters). This shows that *Asahi's* larger coverage is largely due to the amount of non-news items they publish, while the number of news articles is comparable. **Table 2** also presents percentages of each article type in the coverage, by item count and by proportion of total length. Comparing these numbers shows clearly the difference between *Yomiuri's* heavy reliance on news items and *Asahi's* more varied coverage. Almost 80% of *Yomiuri's* articles are in the news category, while the very low numbers in the interview and opinion categories in particular make meaningful comparisons in these categories difficult. However, the extensive length of *Yomiuri's* focus articles brings down the percentage of news in the coverage significantly.

	<i>Yomiuri Shimbun</i>				<i>Asahi Shimbun</i>			
<i>Article type</i>	<i>no. of articles</i>	<i>average length</i>	<i>% of articles</i>	<i>% of length</i>	<i>no. of articles</i>	<i>average length</i>	<i>% of articles</i>	<i>% of length</i>
<i>news</i>	69	676	78,4 %	63,0 %	87	858	43,1 %	37,9 %
<i>focus</i>	8	2049	9,1 %	22,1 %	39	1441	19,3 %	28,5 %
<i>interview</i>	1	1083	1,1 %	1,5 %	20	1615	9,9 %	16,4 %
<i>opinion</i>	2	1363	2,3 %	3,7 %	39	484	19,3 %	9,6 %
<i>editorial</i>	8	901	9,1 %	9,7 %	17	883	8,4 %	7,6 %
<b><i>Total</i></b>	<b>88</b>	<b>841</b>	<b>100 %</b>	<b>100 %</b>	<b>202</b>	<b>975</b>	<b>100 %</b>	<b>100 %</b>

**Table 2.** Lengths and percentages of analysed articles by article type

For *Asahi*, the differences between the different kinds of articles are less drastic. While *Yomiuri's* focus articles are significantly longer than *Asahi's*, the percentage of focus articles in the coverage is still in *Asahi's* favour due to the large number of them. Among other topics, *Asahi* ran a regular APOC focus series during the spring of 2017, where topics were posed as questions and answered as simply as possible. Another notable feature of *Asahi's* coverage is the high number and short length of the reader-submitted opinion pieces. Most of the articles in this category are reader letters with a wide variety of angles and a regular length of 400-500



characters as per the newspaper's specifications, and the median is brought further down by the occasional inclusion of reader-submitted haiku.


**Table 3** shows the articles arranged into brackets by length. The set length of the majority of *Asahi's* opinion letters inflates the second bracket, though it is also a common length for news articles that are not particularly in-depth. The medians of both papers' article lengths fall into this bracket, as do the medians of the news category. Overall, *Yomiuri* has proportionately more articles in the shortest category, but also in the middle one, while *Asahi* clusters heavily in the 400-800 bracket. The shortest articles in the whole material are *Asahi's* reader haiku, the shortest at a mere 29 characters, while the longest news article in *Yomiuri* clocks in at almost 5000, so the variance is significant.

	<i>Yomiuri Shimbun</i>		<i>Asahi Shimbun</i>	
-400	20	23 %	29	14 %
400-800	32	36 %	82	41 %
800-1200	26	30 %	36	18 %
1200-1600	1	1 %	17	8 %
1600-	9	10 %	38	19 %


**Table 3.** Article counts and percentages by length bracket

One of the main goals of this analysis was to examine what change appeared over time in the reporting of the APOC issue. To lay the foundations for the frame analysis in chapter 7.2, **Figure 1** (split on the following two pages) introduces the number, length, and type of articles that both newspapers published during the examined period. The figure displays *Asahi* in shades of brown, *Yomiuri* in shades of blue, and each article type in a different shade. The length of articles and by extension each day's total coverage is indicated in characters.

The figure clearly shows that the coverage is heavier towards the end of the examined period, when the APOC was debated the Upper House. In fact, the median date at which half of the total coverage had been published (by both number of articles and by total length) was May 18th for *Asahi*, and May 20th for *Yomiuri* – in the latter case greatly affected by four of their nine longest articles being published on June 16th.



**Figure 1.** Spread of the coverage over time by article type and length



The amount of coverage on June 16th, the day after the law was passed, is the largest in any single day of the examined period for both newspapers. Although over the whole period *Asahi's* articles average as slightly longer than *Yomiuri's*, on this last day *Yomiuri's* articles being longer than *Asahi's* makes the length of their coverage almost equal.

*Yomiuri's* coverage stayed fairly even-sized until mid-June, its articles dotted one or two per day with empty days in between. On March 22nd, the first day of the coverage, there were four articles (one of them the aforementioned 5000 character one, which goes through the text of the law in detail), but this is the largest single day of coverage by article count until the latter half of May. Until May 20th, the only uptick in *Yomiuri's* coverage coincides with the start of the main discussion in the Lower House (April 7th). In May, the highest peaks follow a day after the passing of the law in the Lower House judicial committee and the Lower House itself, on May 20th and 24th. After the APOC enters the Upper House, *Yomiuri* falls back into its pattern of one or two daily articles until the end of the discussion.

In comparison, the amount of articles not linked to the timing of new developments makes *Asahi's* coverage vary. This results in some peaks in the coverage that do not coincide with any significant developments. Such is the case in the first clear coverage peak which *Asahi* has and *Yomiuri* lacks, on the 18th and 20th of April. On these days, both newspapers report on the same committee meetings in the parliament, and *Asahi* additionally publishes the results of a newly conducted poll. The content of *Asahi's* focus articles on these days is not related to any specific new developments.

*Asahi's* next peak, May 5th, likewise consists of several topics unrelated to new developments, ranging from the interview of a police representative who advocates the security frame, to reporting the views of the United Nations lawyer who drafted the national legislation guide for signatories of the TOC treaty. This day falls on Golden Week, a string of public holidays, when the parliament was on break, and is the only conspicuous indication of *Asahi* timing non-news articles to keep the topic in people's minds when there was no news to report. In *Yomiuri's* case the opposite is true: all their focus articles coincide with news items and expand on those topics.

Towards the latter half of the month, when *Asahi's* coverage begins to gain momentum, there is an increase particularly in the news coverage of the statements of opposition politicians and the popular protests that were picking up outside the parliament and around the country. This is coverage that *Yomiuri* either omits or covers in much shorter form. The increase in

opposition coverage explains part of the difference between *Asahi* and *Yomiuri's* coverage leading up to the Lower House vote on May 24th.

A further explanation for the differences in coverage around this time is the different stance the newspapers took to Special Rapporteur Cannataci. Interestingly, while Cannataci published his open letter to the government already on May 18th, *Asahi* did not bring it up until May 21st and *Yomiuri* not until May 23rd. After this, *Asahi* brought up Cannataci's criticism frequently, including in an interview with him on May 26th, while all of *Yomiuri's* further mentions of the topic appear in the context of the government disputing his worries and criticising his involvement.


Opposition, protests and Cannataci are the three main news topics that explain the difference in coverage size in June as well. June 15th, which is one of the days with the most drastic difference in coverage, is a wide display of highly opinionated content from *Asahi*. While *Yomiuri* keeps to a much shorter coverage, they also make space for two focus articles – a first since the opening of the parliament discussion. The topics and voices featured in the articles will be expanded upon in chapter 8.4.

## 7.2 The frames

This chapter will introduce how both newspapers transmitted the frames that appeared as dominant in the inductive framing analysis, and how this changed over time. The frames are presented in **Figure 2** on the following page. The first number in each segment represents the number of articles, the second number their total character count. The different sizes of the two charts are proportional by character count. The articles are divided based on whether they only featured devices associated with the security or freedom frame, or whether devices associated with both frames appeared. As even a single mention of a contrary frame warrants putting an article in the "both" category, I will look at these articles in more detail later in this chapter to understand to what extent they were weighed towards one frame or the other.

That *Asahi's* coverage leans on the side of the freedom frame is to be expected, with the newspaper's history of opposing the conservative government line and speaking up on issues perceived to be infringing on citizens' rights. Even so, the extent to which the freedom frame dominates this coverage – 154 articles transmitting only the freedom frame compared to only 41 that evoke both frames – is surprising. Unforeseen, on the other hand, is over two thirds of *Yomiuri's* coverage being in articles that include devices from both frames. As *Yomiuri* is

usually a staunch supporter of Prime Minister Abe, this appears as far more neutral than hypothesised. The differing sizes of the total coverage mean that while *Asahi's* coverage in the "both" category is proportionally much smaller than *Yomiuri's*, it is actually longer in total, but even still the difference in percentage is staggering. The qualitative analysis in chapter 8 will cover what these results stem from. The remaining *Yomiuri* coverage is heavily leaning on the security frame, and in both papers the coverage exclusively evoking their non-preferred frame is negligible and the individual article lengths in these instances very short. This places the papers directly opposed in their preference.



**Figure 2.** Length and proportion of content by frame

Comparing the five article types and the dominant frames shows which article types were the most one-sided in their framing. **Tables 4 and 5** on the following page illustrate these results, along with the average length of articles in each category. The percentage in the tables is calculated from the total length of that article type.

<i>Yomiuri Shimbun</i>									
	only security frame			only freedom frame			both appear		
	articles	%	avg length	articles	%	avg length	articles	%	avg length
news	26	32 %	573	3	2 %	279	40	66 %	773
focus	2	17 %	1418	--	--	--	6	83 %	2259
interview	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	100 %	1083
opinion	1	66 %	1811	--	--	--	1	34 %	915
editorial	5	50 %	721	--	--	--	3	50 %	1201

**Table 4.** *Yomiuri's* coverage by frame and article type

<i>Asahi Shimbun</i>									
	only security frame			only freedom frame			both appear		
	articles	%	avg length	articles	%	avg length	articles	%	avg length
news	5	1 %	217	60	56 %	697	22	43 %	1443
focus	--	--	--	27	64 %	1334	12	36 %	1682
interview	1	2 %	741	15	75 %	1606	4	23 %	1866
opinion	1	5 %	1026	36	85 %	445	2	10 %	916
editorial	--	--	--	16	92 %	866	1	8 %	1157

**Table 5.** *Asahi's* coverage by frame and article type

**Table 4** shows clearly that *Yomiuri's* articles which evoke both frames are generally longer than the one-sided ones. This makes sense already from the simple consideration of space: articles that consider multiple viewpoints necessarily require more space for it than articles that only account for one viewpoint. The exception to this is the opinion category, but due to there being only two opinion articles, not many meaningful conclusions can be drawn. The majority of *Yomiuri's* news coverage evokes both frames, and even more clearly the majority of the focus articles. Editorials are the interesting exception: this is the category that most clearly transmits the newspaper's own opinion, and although by length *Yomiuri's* security frame editorials are equal to the editorials that evoke both frames, this is the only category where the security frame articles outnumber the bilateral coverage. The freedom frame coverage is negligible.

*Asahi's* coverage is presented in **Table 5**. As with *Yomiuri*, *Asahi's* articles where both frames appear are generally longer as well. The comparison of news coverage between the freedom frame and the articles where both frames appear is especially interesting. Although the number of news articles unilaterally evoking the freedom frame is almost three times as large as the number of articles evoking both, the latter are more than double in length on average, and so the length of coverage between these two categories evens out to 56% and 43%. Nevertheless, *Asahi's* coverage is still significantly more one-sided than *Yomiuri's*. *Asahi's* much larger coverage in the categories that call for an opinion (interview, opinion and editorial) results in more space for potentially one-sided views than *Yomiuri's* almost completely news-focused coverage does, but inside these categories the tilt towards the freedom frame is astounding. Only one of *Asahi's* 17 editorials even mentions the security frame.

Like *Yomiuri's*, *Asahi's* news articles that transmit the non-preferred frame are short enough to be two- or three-sentence notices. While *Asahi's* one interview and opinion piece each in the security frame is a better representation than *Yomiuri* has with the freedom frame, their significance is low in comparison to the amount of interviews and opinion letters that only evoke the freedom frame.

Looking at the overall **frame weight**, *Asahi's* coverage becomes even more heavily leaning towards the freedom frame. I have calculated the salience of each frame from the number of times devices were used, i.e. frames evoked, in the material. Chapter 7.3 will go deeper into the relative salience of different devices, but the totals are telling. As hypothesised, *Yomiuri's*



coverage leans in favour of the security frame with a 77 % majority of total devices used, while *Asahi* vastly favours the freedom frame with an astonishing 91 % majority. Within the articles that evoke both the security and the freedom frame, these numbers even out slightly, with 71 % in favour of the security frame for *Yomiuri*, and 78 % in favour of the freedom frame for *Asahi*. The newspapers' preferred frames are clearly dominant even when the other frame gains a mention.

In addition to being more strongly leaning on one side of the frame pair in their coverage, *Asahi* also makes use of the framing devices more readily than *Yomiuri*. In other words, its coverage is more strongly framed overall. This is true even accounting for the difference in the length of coverage. On average throughout the period, *Asahi* mentions its preferred freedom frame once every 122 characters, or roughly eight times per article. For *Yomiuri* and the security frame, these numbers are one device per 144 characters, or just under six times per article. While these numbers are not too far apart, *Asahi's* significantly larger coverage means that the numbers of incidences behind them are *Yomiuri's* 513 total uses of a security frame device, versus *Asahi's* 1620 counts of evoking the freedom frame.

In the use of the non-preferred frame the difference is more substantial. *Yomiuri* evokes the freedom frame 157 times in the material, once every 472 characters, but *Asahi* only touches on the security frame 152 times, which in their long coverage means only once every 1296 characters, or less than one time per article.

Adjusted for length of coverage, each paper stays remarkably even in how much they evoke their preferred frame throughout the examined period. The amount of devices used closely follows the length of the coverage. *Yomiuri's* use of their non-preferred freedom frame likewise follows in proportion to size throughout the period. In contrast, *Asahi's* use of the security frame stays uniformly small regardless of the length or number of articles. This plays a large part in the utter dominance of the freedom frame in *Asahi's* coverage. Due to the long coverage on June 15th and 16th, which only evoke the security frame nine times in total compared to the 320 uses of a freedom frame device, it also gives *Asahi* a slight tilt into increasing freedom frame dominance towards the end of the examined period. *Yomiuri's* freedom frame coverage is also at its largest on June 16th, but this is by far the paper's longest day of coverage, and the use of the freedom frame is in proportion to previous coverage.

### 7.3 The predominant devices

This subchapter will introduce the most prevalent devices in the frame packages that the newspapers used. For both newspapers and both frames, only a few devices made up a large majority of the coverage. Equally across the board, the reasoning devices, which are used for defining the problem and its source and laying the blame, were among the most common. Of the framing devices, stereotyping the opposing side is particularly prevalent in both papers' dominant frames. After these, the devices building the reasons for the APOC are most predominant in the security frame coverage, and those taking up its consequences rise high in the freedom frame coverage. The next sections will go deeper into each newspaper and frame in turn. Refer back to Table 1 (pg. 40) for the overview of the frame packages, and to **Appendix B** for a complete list of how many times each device was used in each newspaper's coverage. Table 1 and Appendix B are not fully identical: some devices such as appeals to emotion do not appear independent of other devices and as such cannot be tallied individually; lexical choice, on the other hand, necessarily appears as a function of another device and has been excluded from the calculations in this chapter.

#### 7.3.1 Predominant devices in *Yomiuri Shimbun*

In its security frame coverage, *Yomiuri* relies heavily on discrediting the opponents of the APOC and the government. Its three most common devices all revolve around this. At the top with 13 % of the total devices is stereotyping the opposition as contrarians who care more about opposing the government at every turn than the good of the people. The stereotype is followed by two reasoning devices identifying problem sources: the irresponsible or undignified behaviour of opposition politicians (10,6 %), and those politicians as well as citizens being genuinely misinformed about the contents and nature of the law (8,4 %).

These three devices together account for almost 32 % of all the security frame devices used by *Yomiuri*. The following four, which together account for the next 27 %, are more focused on the direct issue of the APOC: the danger of terrorist attacks and other organised crime presented as a problem definition, the need to sign the international TOC treaty as a reason for the law, and stemming from these, the urgent passage of the law as a solution to the defined problem. These four are very close together in the number of mentions they get, ranging from 35 to 27.

Only ten devices account for 75 % of all the mentions of the security frame in *Yomiuri*. The three remaining ones in the top ten cover roughly 5 % each. The government's careful explanation of the law is presented as a solution to the aforementioned misinformation problem, counterterrorism as a reason for the law, and finally the possibility to safely hold the Tokyo Olympics edges into the top ten as the most mentioned consequence of the law. The rest of the devices introduced in Table 1 receive between 17 and only two mentions in the coverage.

If counterterrorism as a reason and the danger of terrorist attack as a problem definition are counted together, the combined mentions of terrorism just edge out stereotyping the opposition from the top spot with 60 combined mentions versus the stereotype's 59. However, tallying together devices that differ in their function but are very close in content will just as soon move discrediting the opposition back to the top spot, if the top two devices are counted together.

Looking at the spread of different devices across the time period, there are two interesting features. The first of these is a clear clustering of the content-focused devices on certain dates – in late April, late May, and the last few days of coverage – while the devices used for criticising the opposition appear more evenly throughout the coverage. The content-focused clusters coincide with important dates in the parliament discussion, but it is interesting that criticism of the opposition carries as a constant thread through the coverage and indeed appears independently of any issue-focused devices.

The other notable feature is a significant increase in all the predominant devices except the one emphasising the law's urgency on the last day of coverage. The omission of urgency as a device is understandable after the law was already passed. Most of the predominant devices reached their median day of incidences in the last week of May; for urgency this day was already the 19th of May, and notably for the misinformed opponents as a problem source on June 3rd, and the danger of other organised crime than terrorism only on June 10th. The danger of organised crime was mentioned nine times on the last day of coverage, compared to only 17 times in the preceding three months, which is an interesting anomaly. These incidences are also spread out across five different articles, so it is not a question of a single in-depth article concerning this specific thing.

For the freedom frame, the smaller number of incidences makes the percentages behave more dramatically. Three devices make up half of all the mentions and another three bring it over

75 %. Surprising given *Yomiuri's* history as a supporter of Abe and his party is that a stereotype is again at the top spot: painting Abe as a despotic ruler makes up 21 % of all the times the freedom frame is evoked. It must be remembered that 21 % of the total is still only 24 individual mentions; these are primarily quotes from opposition politicians.

The second most popular device again strengthens *Yomiuri's* penchant for concentrating on the political strife over the issue at hand: authoritarian behaviour of the government (distinct of mentions of Abe in person) as a problem definition covers the next 15,8 % of total devices. However, the possibility of ordinary citizens being targeted by the APOC being defined as a problem is neck-to-neck with this, at 15 %. The remaining devices that gather more than 5 % of the total device use are surveillance society (9,6 %) and human rights limitations (7 %) as consequences of the law; vague criteria in the law text (8,8 %) and, linked to the previous two, the possibility of arbitrary investigation (8 %) as problems; and a moral duty for politicians to make meaningful debate (5,3 %). The rest gain scattered mentions; 13 devices are not mentioned at all.

The freedom frame coverage is characterised by a significant increase in the devices criticising the government on June 16th. The median date of incidences of the despot stereotype is June 15th; with the criticism of the government's authoritarian behaviour and allusions to meaningful debate as a moral duty of politicians, it is June 16th itself. Particularly the criticisms of authoritarian behaviour are gathered in one article: a long news story where many opposition members and other critical voices are heard.

### **7.3.2 Predominant devices in *Asahi Shimbun***

*Asahi*, with its extensive coverage, would have much more space in which to introduce different devices. Yet, here as well it is ten devices of the dominant frame that make up 75 % of its total mentions. As with *Yomiuri*, the stereotype of Abe as a despotic leader is the largest, with 13,5 % of the total, or 179 individual mentions. Human rights limitations as a consequence of the APOC takes the second spot with 11,6 %. These two alone account for 25 % of the total. Two problem defining reasoning devices, the possible targeting of ordinary citizens (9,7 %) and the government's authoritarianism (8,3 %) are next largest, and surveillance society as another possible consequence (6,8 %) takes the total to 50 % with only the five most predominant devices.

Another five devices make up the next 25 %. The first two of these are again problem defining: the vague criteria of the law text at 6,3 %, and the possibility of arbitrary investigation at 4,8 %. The inconsistency of the government's arguments as a source of problems is the next largest at 4,7 %. Comparison to the wartime Peace Preservation Act edges into ninth place just ahead of a proposed reason for the law: that the government wants to make it harder for citizens to oppose its future plans. These last two both measure 4,5 % of the total, but the comparison is mentioned 60 times and the reason 59 times.

Due to the volume of *Asahi's* evocations of the freedom frame, even the minor devices still number in tens. The remaining devices range from 55 mentions (the complaint that the APOC is unrelated to terrorism, and the government is merely using that as a buzzword) all the way down to two (the suggested solution to reject the current proposal and try again later with better preparation and amendments).

The majority of the predominant devices reached their median day of incidences between the 18th and 25th of May, speaking for a heavy emphasis on the last quarter of the time period. The only exceptions are the worry for arbitrary application of the law, which reached its median already on the 5th of May, indicating that this device was more important earlier and fell to the wayside towards the end of the examined period, and the stereotype of Abe as a despot, which crossed its median on May 27th. The references to despotism are the only significant outlier in the spread of the coverage: they take a large leap upwards in the last two days of coverage, while the other devices stay in practically the same number of incidences during this huge coverage period as previously. The increase in these references is primarily due to one heavily critical editorial and interview on each of the last two days, which together account for 30 out of 66 mentions. Of the remaining devices, worries for human rights limitations and complaints of authoritarianism pull slightly apart from the rest.

With its security frame coverage, *Asahi* is rather more focused on the issue over the accompanying political strife compared to what *Yomiuri* or *Asahi's* own freedom frame coverages have been shown to be. The top four devices, which together account for almost 55 % of the security frame coverage, are focused on the APOC itself. Counterterrorism as a reason for the law is the most predominant at 19,3 % of the whole. Behind this number are 26 individual mentions: in the much larger freedom frame coverage, a number like this would only merit a 16th place in the ranking. A second reason for the law, signing the TOC treaty, ranks second in the security frame coverage with 15,6 %. Third is a problem definition: the


danger of a terrorist attack (10,4 %). Safety of the Olympics as a consequence of the law ranks fourth at 9,6 %.

Another three devices take the total to 75 %. These are two more problem definitions and a problem source. The irresponsibility of the opposition is the first strife-focused device, and comes fifth at 8 % of the total. Next is the opponents of the law being misinformed about its contents (6,7 %) and finally the insufficiency of the current law as a problem definition (5,2 %). Eleven more devices receive between five mentions and one, and five none at all.

I initially feared that the small size of *Asahi's* security coverage would make it difficult to draw any valid conclusions about it, but interestingly this is the device set where a change in predominant devices throughout the period is most clearly visible. Three of the primary issue-focused devices, counterterrorism, Olympics, and the danger of terrorist attack, cross their median in April or early May, meaning they are more heavily present during the first half of the examined period, while the complaint of the opposition's irresponsibility doesn't even appear until April 20th, the same day that two of the previous devices peaked, reaches its median on June 2nd, and is the only device that sees significant use on June 16th.

### 7.3.3 Comparisons

There was a significant overlap in both papers' predominant devices, much more so in the freedom frame. Although six predominant devices overlap also in the security frame devices (**Table 6**), their order is scrambled and *Yomiuri's* most predominant device, the opposition-as-contrarian stereotype, does not appear in *Asahi's* list at all. *Yomiuri's* primary focus on strife devices and *Asahi's* foregrounding of issue devices is clear in how these have almost perfectly changed places in each paper's ordering. Only the danger of terrorist attack is similarly important in both framings. *Yomiuri's* 6th most predominant device, the risk of non-terrorist organised crime, is 8th place in *Asahi's* coverage, just outside of the percentage range that I have defined as the predominant devices, but the other devices that appear on each list are farther away from the predominant range in the other paper's coverage.



**Table 6.** Comparison of predominant devices in the security frame

There is a greater similarity in the freedom frame devices (**Table 7**). The newspapers share their most predominant device, the Abe-as-despot stereotype, and only the ranking of the worry for human rights limitations shuffles up the top seven. In that, though, the difference is significant, and it is interesting how much more *Asahi* brings the possibility of human rights infringement to the fore than *Yomiuri*. The vast difference in the number of times each paper evoked the frame likely plays a role here, as *Yomiuri's* use of the freedom frame is so small that the last device defined as predominant had a mere six individual mentions.

The devices that do not appear on both lists are all on the bottom. Of these, the duty to hold meaningful debate appears lower on *Asahi's* list with 2,6 % of the total coverage, but of the ones *Asahi* used, only comparison to the Peace Preservation Act received a single mention from *Yomiuri*, the other two none at all.

<i>Yomiuri Shimbun</i>		<i>Asahi Shimbun</i>
Abe as despot		Abe as despot
government authoritarianism		human rights limitations
ordinary people argument		ordinary people argument
surveillance society		government authoritarianism
vague criteria		surveillance society
arbitrary investigation		vague criteria
human rights limitations		arbitrary investigation
duty of meaningful debate		inconsistency of arguments
		comparison to Peace Preservation Act
		making it harder to oppose government


**Table 7.** Comparison of predominant devices in the freedom frame

The extent to which the devices concerning political strife dominated the coverage was surprising. Separating individual devices strictly into two based on whether they refer to the APOC itself or the political strife surrounding it is both impossible and meaningless, given especially *Asahi's* strong tendency to use the conduct of the government as a reason to fear what the government would do with the law, but I want to compare the most clearly strife-focused devices with the rest, as well as criticism of the government and the opposition with each other.

For the security frame, the clearly strife-focused devices are the opposition-as-contrarian stereotype, the accusation of irresponsibility, and three devices from lower down the list: accusing the opposition of using delay tactics, the government's concessions as a solution, and the visual device of showing disorder in the parliament. I have left out the devices related to misunderstanding and explanation, as misunderstanding can be genuine and not necessarily related to political disorder.



For the freedom frame, I have counted the Abe-as-despot stereotype, accusations of government authoritarianism, and making it harder to oppose the government as a reason for the law as the pure strife devices. This is a conservative decision, but criticism of the government and criticism of the APOC are deeply intertwined in the freedom frame, and these are the devices most clearly separate from a criticism of the law.



**Figure 3.** Percentage of strife focused and other devices in the coverage

**Figure 3** above demonstrates the percentages. The blue and orange segments always mark the amount of direct criticism of the opposing side – of the opposition in the security frame, and of the government in the freedom frame. *Yomiuri's* greater emphasis on political strife is clear, as is *Asahi's* security frame focusing more on issue-specific devices. It is the freedom frame

coverage that truly surprises. The first of them is that *Asahi's* coverage is less critical than presumed. The wording of some of *Asahi's* editorials especially is truly venomous, and the impression one brings away from their coverage is more critical of the government than a mere quarter of the devices would imply.


The true surprise is *Yomiuri's* freedom frame coverage being the most critical of all. It is possibly explained by *Yomiuri's* preference for reporting mostly news of parliament happenings, where uncommented statements from the opposition – naturally inclined to critique the government to the media – could account for the use of these devices. However, that does not explain the lack of other devices in proportion, because opposition members would just as naturally want to spread their own viewpoint. It must be remembered that although the percentages show that *Yomiuri* is more critical of the government in what freedom frame coverage it has, that coverage is very small, and *Asahi's* smaller percentage hides over 300 more incidences.

**Figures 4 and 5** on the next page demonstrate how each newspaper's criticism of the government and the opposition changed over time. The most notable feature here is the massive increase of criticism of the government in the last two days of coverage, even in *Yomiuri*. *Yomiuri* also increased its criticism of the opposition, with the peak on the 15th, but the rise in government criticism is unprecedented. The amount of times *Yomiuri* criticises the government only surpasses their opposition criticism twice during the time period: both of these, on April 2nd and May 5th, are single articles where a politician expresses their disapproval of a decision of the LDP.


When viewing the *Asahi* chart, the difference in scale in comparison to *Yomiuri's* must be kept in mind. The amount of times *Asahi* criticises the government on the 15th and 16th of June is unprecedented and incomparable to anything in this dataset. In comparison, *Asahi's* criticism of the opposition is almost too small to measure, although it too peaks on the 16th, only much lower.

The two newspapers most clearly show their sides in the upticks that occur throughout the examined period, which coincide almost perfectly. The only difference in these small peaks – on April 7th, May 20th and May 24th, which coincide with important dates in the discussion – is which side of the debate the newspaper chooses to criticise. In addition to the shared peaks, *Yomiuri* has a significant increase in opposition criticism on May 10th that *Asahi* does not

mirror. Behind this is one of *Yomiuri*'s leading editorials on the subject, which is one of its most strongly framed articles when looking at devices per length, and uses nine of its 13 devices – all pertaining to the security frame – to criticise the opposition.



**Figure 4.** Criticism of the government and opposition in *Yomiuri Shimbun*



**Figure 5.** Criticism of the government and opposition in *Asahi Shimbun*

## 8. Qualitative analysis

This chapter will move away from dissecting the details and take a step towards the bigger picture to look at those features of the coverage that cannot be adequately analysed with numbers alone. As the preferred frames of the newspapers are so clearly divided, a quantitative comparison of their devices can only go so far. In this chapter I will first give an introductory description of both newspapers' coverages, expanding on the previous chapter but also introducing features that could not be covered in a quantitative inquiry. Chapter 8.3 briefly covers thematic and lexical similarities, as well as the secondary frames that saw intermittent use in both papers, but primarily this chapter is concerned with analysing the features that set the two sources apart.

Based on the quantitative analysis, the central features turned out to be agenda management, the choice of what to consider as worthy news to report and who these choices benefit; the allocation of voice and credence to the various partisan actors involved in the conversation, and the ways their trustworthiness was emphasised or questioned; emotional themes, of interest because both newspapers largely evoked the same emotions, but for entirely different reasons; and the use of particularly evocative terminology as opinion management. On the other hand, grammatical agency, which I had been prepared to analyse, did not offer much of interest. These comparisons make up chapter 8.4.

### 8.1 Overarching features of *Yomiuri's* coverage

*Yomiuri's* coverage is most clearly characterised by its focus on the events of the parliament discussion. The conflict is portrayed as being between the government and the opposition parties, and the emphasis is placed on disorder and delays in the parliament. The news coverage, which accounts for a majority of the material, is largely void of journalist commentary, reporting parliament developments and the accompanying partisan frames with an air of direct transmission. This gives the news articles an outward air of strict neutrality and accounts for most of *Yomiuri's* freedom frame content as statements from the opposition are transmitted without commentary.

However, *Yomiuri's* choices of terminology and particularly reporting verbs carry experiential and expressive values which are geared to evoke agreement with the government at the expense of the opposition. *Yomiuri* uses the government's preferred name "terrorism

preparation crime" and habitually introduces the APOC as a law that "makes organised crime punishable at the planning stage", clearly tying it to crime prevention with its terminology. This and a repetition of the law's "strict parameters", a government mantra, are examples of building a catchphrase memory by associating counterterrorism, organised crime and strict parameters for enforcement as key concepts of the APOC. In addition to word choices, *Yomiuri* primarily frames by agenda-setting: by deciding what is reported, who is heard, and which angles are omitted entirely. These features are central to the analysis, and will be examined in-depth in chapter 8.4.

One feature that appears more prominently in the coverage than it came across in the quantitative is the expressed urgency of the APOC. Although it featured as only the fourth most common device of the security frame, it is emphasised in a qualitative inquiry: one of the main reasons both the government and *Yomiuri* itself criticise the opposition is their irresponsibility in *delaying* the law. The importance of the law and the danger of terrorism is first emphasised, then the opposition can be implied to care more about opposing the government at any price necessary than protecting the citizens from terrorism. The tendency noted in chapter 7.3 of the opposition criticism carrying as the constant throughout the examined period, with other devices clustering on dates when something significant happened at the Diet, is largely due to the news consisting of reports of the opposition delaying the discussion on the days when the discussion made no significant progress. The bulk of this criticism is pointed towards the Democratic Party, the largest in the opposition, while the other three parties that opposed the APOC are hardly mentioned.

*Yomiuri's* emphasis on political life means its articles cover several topics of focus that *Asahi* did not touch on at all. These all deal with political manoeuvring. In the first two weeks of the examined period, *Yomiuri* gave significant attention to a rift between the LDP and Kōmeitō, the two government parties, regarding the timing of the APOC proposal in the parliament. LDP wanted to give priority to the APOC over two previously delivered proposals which according to parliament custom should have been discussed first, while Kōmeitō wished for the customary order to prevail. This disagreement was solved with a compromise, and *Yomiuri* moved on.

The Tokyo local elections, upcoming in July, appeared as a frequent reason for the APOC's urgency, portrayed by *Yomiuri* as the underlying true cause as to why the government wanted to rush the law through legislation: to avoid the possibility of unpleasant press fresh in

people's minds during the campaign period. These allusions increased as the debate dragged on and extending the parliament session was speculated. *Yomiuri* also kept a constant tab on how much time would be required to process the law and what day it might be expected to pass, bringing timing and the importance of political tactics further to the fore.

In accordance with its heavily politically focused style of coverage, *Yomiuri's* use of images in the articles is sparing, and mostly focused on portrait-like pictures of politicians speaking in parliament or committee. The devices relating to opposition unruliness are reinforced with images of disorder in the parliament twice, and on June 16th one image of the protests outside parliament is included. In tables collecting the APOC's central points, terrorism is illustrated with explosions and shadowy figures with evil smiles.

*Yomiuri's* use of sources outside of the parliament press conferences and directly quoting the discussion is even sparser than its use of images. Three police representatives and five legal experts give comments in favour of the security frame in the longer focus articles, all but one in the last two days of coverage. Once on May 20th and twice on June 16th, short comments from interviewed protesters make up the entirety of the paper's outside-sourced freedom coverage. The only interview in the material is with the retired police chief who was in charge of the Aum Shinrikyō sarin attack investigation in 1995, who has the gravitas to speak of the importance of cracking down on crime in the planning stage.

## **8.2 Overarching features of *Asahi's* coverage**

As has become evident in chapter 7, *Asahi's* coverage of the APOC proposal was prolific and with widespread criticism of the government. It had also begun significantly before the introduction of the proposal in the parliament: *Asahi* ran a focus article series on the topic since February, when the proposal was initially presented to government parties for commentary. This means that *Asahi's* attitude and many of its favoured devices were well in place by the time the parliament debate started, and may have played a part in setting the opposition's agenda.

From the start *Asahi* opted consistently for "anti-conspiracy bill" in talking about the law and its regularly repeated description phrase was "a law proposal which incorporates the spirit of the anti-conspiracy bill that crimes will be punished at the planning stage"<sup>vii</sup>, later also "a law that could limit human rights"<sup>viii ix</sup>. Although both newspapers' descriptions included the gist

that planning a crime would become punishable, the angle is very different. Further, *Asahi* has a tendency to write the word "anti-conspiracy bill" in white on a black background in its headlines, dramatically boxing the word in to catch attention. This is akin to writing in capital letters in an alphabetical language.

Unlike *Yomiuri*, which concentrated on the political conflict in its coverage, *Asahi* heavily emphasises a popular protest, the government against the people. The opposition plays an odd role in this, placed on the side of the people but not as a part of it. *Asahi* groups itself squarely with the people. This is a central feature that carries subtly across the coverage, from comment columns on the side of news articles that brings the journalist's opinion forward, to a large amount of reader letters, to a thematic emphasis on ordinary people's doubts and worries, to extensive protest coverage always using the organiser's estimate of the participant count. The use of markedly informal language in editorials, to emphasise social closeness with the reader by using relational values of grammar, is also notable. Another, subtler grammatical feature that *Asahi* uses to emphasise that the law is the ordinary citizen's problem is the question form:

"Isn't this becoming an informant society?"<sup>x</sup>

"Won't there be investigations that invade all the way into people's  
inner thoughts?"<sup>xi</sup>

"How far will society cast the eye of surveillance?"<sup>xii</sup>

Phrasing worries as questions coaxes the reader to subconsciously answer them and therefore to form an opinion. As people are by nature more likely to approve of their own ideas, triggering an opinion-forming reaction could be a powerful tool in directing public opinion if the collocation of the question and *Asahi's* heavily framed coverage can affect that opinion. This is a stark contrast to *Yomiuri*, which writes in declarative sentences, simply stating its version of the truth. This difference could be seen as a mirroring of the government's and opposition's positions in the debate: the government is in a position of control, repeating declarative statements, the opposition is imploring them to consider the problems they see, but powerless to make a difference as long as the government holds their position.

Another interesting detail of the language used is *Asahi's* occasional lapse into modalising its claims by attributing them to an anonymous group of worried observers, such as "suspicions that [the law] might violate freedom of thought are deep-rooted"<sup>xiii</sup> and "many citizens'

apprehensions have to do with not only the law itself, but deep distrust towards a government that calls white black"<sup>xiv</sup>. The latter example is from a leading editorial.

Alongside and often linked to the citizen resistance, the other main theme that runs in *Asahi's* coverage is the government's questionability, which was also clearly visible in the quantitative analysis. *Asahi* is particularly prone to using criticism of the government as a reason to oppose the APOC. Criticism of the law's contents is focused on the possibility of its misuse against citizen activists, doubt is cast at the government for proposing a law with such possibilities, and criticism of the process is used as final proof that a government that would bypass due legislative process cannot be trusted to not misuse the law. Framing Prime Minister Abe as a would-be despot is *Asahi's* preferred angle of approach, and the picture of the government obstinately refusing to discuss the opposition's worries falls right into this line. Abe is often used as the symbol of his entire administration: this explains part of the emphasis on the despot stereotype, as dislike of the entire government is personified into Abe. The despotism angle emphasises the power gap between the government and other actors. The narrative *Asahi* builds is a classic but powerful one: the underdog against a powerful foe, opposition against the monolith wall of an authoritarian government, the people shouting outside the gates. The latter is shown literally, as *Asahi's* coverage includes 13 pictures of protesters, with a marked emphasis on protest pictures taken after dark, stressing the direness of the situation.

The extensive coverage of protests is one feature that sets *Asahi* apart from *Yomiuri*, which mentioned the protests very briefly. In addition to citizen demonstrations and statements of opposition from various non-governmental organisations, *Asahi* brings attention to a trend of local politicians from different parts of Japan sending letters to the parliament, primarily to urge for careful discussion. Recalling past and recent wrongdoings by the government or police, a device brought in by *Asahi's* reader letters, is taken up and expanded as a succession of cautionary tales used to illustrate why the government's assurances that the law will not be misused cannot be trusted. These tales stretch from the persecution of the "unpatriotic" in wartime, to very recent cases of the police investigating citizen organisations like they were criminal suspects.

*Asahi's* varied articles give it a wider range of non-parliament sources than *Yomiuri*. Statements from people interviewed at protests are very common. Of particular note is also a series of focus articles where the pen is handed over to notable people in the fields of



literature, art or law to give their views on the APOC. These articles are often florid in their defence of the freedom frame, especially when written by people whose livings depend on full freedom of speech and publishing, who tend to view the APOC as one step in a continued process towards limited citizen freedoms under Abe.

In counterbalance to its emphasis on grassroots resistance, *Asahi* readily brings in legal experts, both academics and practicing lawyers and judges, to give weight to its views. The views of these legal experts are overwhelmingly in favour of the freedom frame, which suggests some care in the choice of interviewees on *Asahi's* part. Two legal experts and two police-affiliated sources are quoted in favour of the security frame, as are some reader letters. In an interesting parallel to *Yomiuri's* interview with the Aum Shinrikyō investigator, *Asahi* interviews the public prosecutor who was in charge of the case. In contrast to the investigating detective, he does not believe the APOC could have prevented the attacks, simply due to a lack of any forewarning whatsoever.

The emphasis on popular resistance is *Asahi's* main journalist frame. Frequent comparison to the wartime Peace Preservation Act is also a device that does not stem from the parliament. It was present already at the very start of the examined period, alluded to in an editorial on March 22nd. Like *Yomiuri*, *Asahi* also takes up and expands on many features from partisan frames. The selection of particular reader letters for inclusion is already an example of taking up a partisan frame, and *Asahi* frequently expands on reader-submitted topics in later articles.

### **8.3 Similarities and secondary frames**

Despite their often directly opposite angles and opinions, *Yomiuri* and *Asahi* also have some clear similarities in their coverage. The most obvious of these is the shared use of terminology evoking a war frame and a game frame in description of political discussion. Describing politics in terms of a battle or a game is generic in political reporting, but *Yomiuri* goes a step further in this, once illustrating the means that the opposition has at its disposal to delay the passing of the APOC as a literal hand of playing cards<sup>xv</sup>. These secondary frames emphasise the political strife angle of the reporting, but do not appear commonly enough to be considered codominant.

In all the focus on political strife and placing the blame on different sides, one of the only things *Yomiuri* and *Asahi* seem to agree on is their mutual dislike of Justice Minister Kaneda,

whose wavering and repetitive answers to committee questions were considered unhelpful to the discussion. This far *Yomiuri* and *Asahi* are in agreement, but their reasoning for why Kaneda's behaviour earns their criticism reflects their frames of choice. *Yomiuri* disapproves of Kaneda's inability to justify the law to the opposition and the people, fearing that a poor orator is hindering the support for an important law; *Asahi* holds Kaneda's inability to explain the law sufficiently and the repeated contradiction of his own and ministry officials' statements as proof that the APOC is badly conceived and should be voted down or at least thoroughly reworked. *Yomiuri* calls for Abe to question if Kaneda's talents would be best used somewhere else<sup>xvi</sup>; *Asahi* holds Kaneda's purported inability as indicative of Abe's incompetence<sup>xvii</sup>.

On a more practical level, a structural similarity that often appears is a question and answer format in explanatory articles. This is a format that especially *Asahi*, with its many focus articles, prefers. In addition to being simple to understand at a glance, the power of the question format is in the newspaper's liberty to define the question and thus to define the problem. Discussing the APOC's necessity, *Yomiuri* phrased its question as "why is it necessary?"<sup>xviii</sup>, while *Asahi* asks "is it necessary?"<sup>xix</sup>. Another way *Asahi* uses the power of the question-answer format to subtly influence is exemplified in its 教えて!共謀罪 focus series ("tell me about the anti-conspiracy bill!"). The questions in this series are formulated in informal language, and give an air of being genuine questions by regular people, strengthening *Asahi's* theme of ordinary people's worries.

#### **8.4 Comparisons of major distinguishing features**

This chapter is divided into four subchapters, concentrating on four key areas that illustrate the differences between *Asahi* and *Yomiuri's* framing and the reality they choose to forward. Some features commonly considered significant in Western linguistic scholarship, such as the use of passive or active voice in assigning blame and responsibility, did not carry particular significance in this data. This is partially due to the structures of the Japanese language, but partially also to the realities presented by the newspapers being so far apart from each other that an analysis of finer grammar details would not have yielded any new information.

#### 8.4.1 Whose agenda?

As discussed in chapter 4.2, selecting certain features for increased salience and others for exclusion is a key part of framing. This is a utilisation of agenda setting power, one of the most powerful tools at a newspaper's disposal: the power to influence what people think about and talk about by influencing what they know about. Chapter 7.3 analysed at length which features the newspapers decided to emphasise, and so this subchapter is primarily concerned with the origins of the emphasised features.

In the case of the APOC debate, the agenda setting power of the newspapers is somewhat lessened by the fact that the topic they are reporting is a parliament discussion, and hence the total omission of the main parties' arguments, let alone the whole discussion, would be too obvious. The parliament, therefore, sets the topic, but the newspapers fully engage in managing the direction of its coverage by emphasising some features at the expense of others. *Yomiuri's* emphasis on political manoeuvring and *Asahi's* on popular protest are clear examples of this. Coming from outside the main discussion that both papers report, these sides of the issue, both equally true, receive disproportionately different coverage.

An important question is where the centralised topics originate from. *Yomiuri's* emphasis on political strife is there from day one, introduced by the opposition with such dire phrasing as "do-or-die resistance to the bitter end"<sup>xx</sup> and immediately picked up and carried by *Yomiuri*. Although the opposition is the origin of this feature, it does not benefit from it: rather, the opposition's sharp rhetoric was one of the main targets of criticism from both *Yomiuri* and the government. *Yomiuri* also echoes the government's emphasis on urgency and becomes its primary propagator, tying together the strife and urgency devices as a reason to criticise the opposition's behaviour. Thus the emphasis of these devices comes out benefiting the government, and specifically the LDP, which was behind the urgency angle.

*Asahi* reproduces the same warlike opposition statements, but limits its references to political manoeuvring to quotes from politicians given in parliament press conferences. *Yomiuri*, which dedicates several articles to the description of political drama alone, is more consciously nudging the agenda towards strife with its topic choice. *Asahi* is also quick to insert its opinion of the government's untrustworthiness, so the strife discussion benefits the opposition by portraying it as righteously resisting the oppressor. While criticism of the government also originates from the opposition, this is a device that *Asahi* emphasises in its

editorials. So do the majority of opinion letters and interviews. This is part of why criticism of Abe tops the list of frequent devices in *Asahi's* coverage: it comes in from all directions.

Given how *Asahi's* coverage of the APOC started well before the parliament discussion and the examined period, it is difficult to determine to which extent *Asahi* is the originator of the devices it centralises. The emphasis on the same arguments as the opposition uses and centralisation of the failings of the government benefits the opposition parties, but *Asahi* also criticises the opposition – primarily for ineffective arguing.

While many of *Asahi's* arguments coincide with those of the opposition, it also introduces features not covered in parliament. The emphasis on protest coverage is *Asahi's* own. Although ultimately *Asahi* portrays the protesters as powerless, they are also a partisan actor in the conflict and their cause benefits from the space given to it. At the same time, *Asahi* benefits from portraying ordinary citizens publicly agreeing with the arguments it has pushed.

The majority of truly original arguments, however, come from *Asahi's* rich and varied reader letters and interviews. These include, among other things, the entire material's only references to the freedom of religion<sup>xxi xxii</sup> and the freedom of association<sup>xxiii</sup>. Although these are primarily in defence of the freedom frame, they also include the most sincere defences of the security frame that *Asahi's* coverage has, such as a letter from a reader who lived under significant terrorist threat in Kenya<sup>xxiv</sup>. *Asahi's* security frame coverage is interesting in that despite being so small, it is formed out of multiple sources: reader opinions, interviewees primarily in the police or the field of law, but also in literature, as well as government statements in parliament.

The larger amount of outside-sourced content such as interviews in *Asahi's* coverage would point to comparatively more partisan framing in *Asahi*, but the reverse is true. Despite the scarcity of outsider sources in the material, the majority of *Yomiuri's* framed content comes from partisan sources, and overwhelmingly this source is the government. The percentage of government-originated content is inflated precisely because *Yomiuri* rarely allows any opinion from outside the parliament into its coverage.

In particular *Yomiuri's* ways of talking about the APOC itself are set by what the government puts forward. In defence of the law, *Yomiuri* solely employs devices that the government has introduced, including in its editorials. Naturally, this arena given to its arguments furthers the government's cause. The only argument that *Yomiuri* originates in the whole discussion is the

worry that including stricter limitations on the law could limit its usability. This device is first brought up in an editorial on the first day of coverage<sup>xxv</sup>, and later echoed by the police interviewee<sup>xxvi</sup>.

The freedom frame content likewise comes almost uniformly from the parliament, in this case as quotes from politicians outside the LDP. The only feature of the freedom frame that *Yomiuri* spreads actively is the criticism of the government's handling of the debate, which it views in editorials as unhelpful to the goal of spreading further understanding. Much of this criticism is directed towards Justice Minister Kaneda. Interestingly, criticism of Kaneda is a device that comes from multiple sources: *Yomiuri's* first mention of it comes from government party Kōmeitō<sup>xxvii</sup>, but it is also taken up on the same day in the same editorial as the usability question. The way the criticism is phrased, however, does not benefit the opposition, who argued relentlessly against Kaneda. As *Yomiuri's* criticism hinges on the worry that Kaneda's subpar performance would hinder the passage of the APOC, it does not agree with the opposition's reasoning.

The one issue where *Yomiuri* truly takes a stance against the government's agenda appears at the very end of the coverage period. The government's decision to bypass the Upper House judicial committee with a full house vote drew criticism from parliament and *Yomiuri* alike. Reactions to this decision from all sides explain the peak in government criticism in the last two days of *Yomiuri's* coverage. The passage of the APOC was effectively decided with this decision, so the only damage to the government from the backlash is reputational.

The newspapers' different agendas are visible with curious clarity in their choice of which target crimes of the APOC to foreground. *Yomiuri* uses serious violent crimes such as murder and plane hijacking as its regular examples, emphasising the importance of the APOC for security. *Asahi*, meanwhile, picks its examples from the crimes whose inclusion was criticised for being tangentially related to organised crime at best: copyright infringement, stamp forgery and, most prominently, illegal foraging in a nature reserve. Their handling of the opposition's statements is similarly polarised, only mirrored. *Asahi* includes statements that foreground the opposition's frustration with the law and the government, emphasising the government's lack of cooperation; *Yomiuri* chooses opposition statements that emphasise their arguments' repetitiveness and discredit their concerns.

Agenda management by omission is the primary way *Yomiuri* uses its power to influence. Rather than offer opinions, it presents a curated reality as the truth, and implies the insignificance or nonexistence of other views by omission. Its emphasis on political drama does not invite citizen discussion: the issue is presented as belonging wholly to the realm of politics, and while its leading editorials on the subject are opinionated, they also endorse the politicians' agency, urging the government and opposition by turns towards better negotiation<sup>xxviii xxix</sup>.

*Asahi* manages less by omission and more by discussion and commentary: despite what the overwhelming percentage of freedom frame dominance would imply, it is not that *Asahi* fails to publish the government's statements on the topic. Rather, it has a pronounced tendency to immediately call these statements to question with the reply of an opposition member or a callback to an earlier contradiction. This brings the agenda back to a government-opposed view. The regular reliance on an opponent's reply as the last word of the article or a "however" segue into an earlier government statement that contradicts what was just quoted explains why the numbers were so clearly in favour of the freedom frame: as being immediately contradicted stops a device from building towards a frame, a large amount of potential security frame devices in *Asahi's* coverage were simply discounted. It also accounts for my impression as a reader of *Asahi's* extreme criticism of the government.

#### **8.4.2 Voice and credence**

The last chapter touched on the importance of voice for agenda setting. Which parties get to speak their truth naturally influences the resulting frame greatly. However, being heard and reported is by itself no guarantee of being able to spread a preferred agenda: a voice only matters if it is also given credence, reported in such a way as to not discredit the speaker. In a dataset such as this that largely echoes partisan frames, the credence given to the sources becomes a central feature of journalist origin. This chapter will delve into the lexical and grammatical features used to evoke trust and distrust in the various partisan actors involved in the debate.

The first of these features is the choice of reporting verbs in the direct quoting of politicians' statements. The choice of a neutral verb such as "says" or one with a negative experiential value such as "claims" makes a big difference in the credence of the statement, even if the message itself is transmitted word-for-word.

For both papers, the majority of reporting verbs used are of neutral value. Where they part from this baseline, a familiar divide emerges: *Asahi's* loaded verbs point the blame at the government, *Yomiuri's* at the opposition. The difference is especially clear when each paper's preferred party is presented in the same context with a neutral or positively loaded verb. In *Yomiuri*, the government "emphasises", while the opposition "insists"<sup>xxx</sup>, in *Asahi* the government "touts"<sup>xxxii</sup>, "fixates on" their point and "repeats", while the opposition "requests"<sup>xxxiii</sup>, "points out" or "voices concern"<sup>xxxiii</sup>. Interestingly, both sides tend to use the exact same verbs, only pointed at opposing parties.

Illustrating the nature of the parliament debate, variations of "repeat" are the most popular negatively valued reporting verbs. These references increase in frequency towards the end of the examined period, as the debate ground more to a halt in the parliament, but *Asahi* refers to the government's "repeating yet again" as early as April 20th<sup>xxxiv</sup>. *Yomiuri* refers to the opposition with "keep repeating" in May<sup>xxxv</sup> and June<sup>xxxvi</sup>, *Asahi* to the government again at the end of May<sup>xxxvii</sup>, and goes as far as "obstinately repeating" by the end of the time period<sup>xxxviii</sup>.

In addition to verb choice, *Asahi* has a pronounced tendency to provoke doubt towards the government's words by reporting it as second-hand information. Instead of reporting the importance or necessity of the APOC as a simple qualified statement, *Asahi* hedges with "the government says it is important for counterterrorism"<sup>xxxix</sup>, "Abe is explaining that it is important for counterterrorism"<sup>xl</sup> or "the government is portraying it as necessary"<sup>xli</sup>.

Although unwaveringly critical of the opposition parties throughout, *Yomiuri* varies more in how it places its sympathies in relation to the two government parties: during the early weeks when the LDP and Kōmeitō were having a disagreement on preferred procedure, *Yomiuri* first reported the Prime Minister as "asking for cooperation" and Kōmeitō as "insisting"<sup>xlii</sup>, then a week later LDP "pushing over" Kōmeitō to "jump into" a vote<sup>xliii</sup>.

This kind of loaded descriptive language is one of the central means used to credit or discredit the parliament actors. The material has some staggeringly strong wording for a newspaper dataset, and only some of it comes from quoted partisan actors. *Yomiuri* calls the opposition's arguments "extreme" and "fanning citizens' fears" repeatedly in editorials<sup>xliv xlv</sup>, in addition to quoting the government's statement about the opposition as "antagonising with excessive measures"<sup>xlvi</sup> and an expert interviewee's remarks about their "one-sided extreme

arguments"<sup>xlvi</sup>. Similarly, *Asahi* repeatedly refers to the government's "obstinate insistence" on the truth of their arguments<sup>xlvi</sup> <sup>xlvi</sup>. Both *Asahi's* editor and the Democratic Party refer to the government's handling of the debate as "coercive", "trampling principles"<sup>li</sup> and "walking over the rules"<sup>lii</sup>, and a reader opinion adds on "contempt of the parliament"<sup>liii</sup>.

Colourful description of the parliament debate appears throughout the time period and on all sides. *Yomiuri* describes the opposition's actions variously as "refusing to compromise"<sup>liv</sup>, "a revolt"<sup>lv</sup> or "deplorable"<sup>lvi</sup>, but also describes the government's final interim report measure to end the debate as "reckless" and "chipping legality"<sup>lvii</sup>. Especially earlier in the examined period, *Asahi* occasionally implies the government is having trouble handling the debate, such as the repeated reference to their answers as "see-sawing"<sup>lviii</sup>, with the government "trying to run away" while the opposition "thrusts at problem points one after the other"<sup>lix</sup>, or increasing the participation of a bureaucrat in the committee "to pull through"<sup>lx</sup>, linking to Minister Kaneda's problematic replies. Both newspapers refer to Kaneda as "dodging answering"<sup>lxi</sup> <sup>lxii</sup>, and *Yomiuri* additionally as "monotonous, incoherent and inconsistent"<sup>lxiii</sup>.

*Asahi's* reader opinions and interviews are the source of many very direct comments on the law and the government. The previously referenced opinion letter additionally calls the current political situation a "crisis caused by the indolence of rulers". One interviewee, fearing for the freedom of citizen movements, asks whether the APOC might not "accelerate the tendency to throw people who are judged deviant to the wolves"<sup>lxiv</sup>. One of the subtler and at the same time most damning lexical choices comes from a historian interviewed by *Asahi*<sup>lxv</sup>, who compares the actions of Abe's government to that of pre-War Japan, especially their reactions to international criticism, and equates the two subtly by using identical verbs in her descriptions of their actions.

Agenda setting overlaps with credence where the actions of one side or the other are chosen for inclusion and described in ways that are likely to evoke either disapproval or sympathy, in an attempt to change the reader's opinion of the described actor and thus their likelihood to believe their arguments. Both newspapers engage in such emotive description, though in vastly different contexts.

*Yomiuri*, true to its emphasis on strife in the parliament, primarily saves dramatic description for mentioning undignified behaviour of opposition members. Raised voices and disorder in committee meetings are described as "throwing sparks" and "uproar as opposition members



surrounded the chairman's seat"<sup>lxvi</sup> and again a month later as opposition members "resisted, taking papers from Chairman Suzuki, pinning his hands"<sup>lxvii</sup>. *Asahi* covered the description of this latter event with "yelling" and opposition members "approaching" the chairman's seat<sup>lxviii</sup>.

For *Asahi*, the emotion evoked most often is sympathy, and the targets of that sympathy are the protesters and activists taking a stand against the law. Describing the frustration, fear, and sadness of regular people evokes sympathy to the individuals and through them to their cause. In the same article as the committee meeting just described, an interviewed protester is described as "shedding tears". By June, tears have given way to "sighs and bitter smiles"<sup>lxix</sup> in a demonstration where people read the transcript of the parliament discussion out loud to bring attention to how little relation there is between the questions and answers, although protesters in this event describe their concern as well. Since the law that got pushed back to make time for the APOC was meant to strengthen the punishments for sex crimes among other things, *Asahi's* editor calls for sympathy for the victims who are being made to wait for justice, among other things describing rape as the "murder of the soul"<sup>lxx</sup>. Stories from the victims of wartime censorship or recent police misconduct are also frequent for evoking sympathy and fear.

Opinion on the integrity of the police forces is a clear divider between *Asahi* and *Yomiuri*. *Asahi* brings up recent cases of mismanaged investigations from the first day<sup>lxxi</sup>, and continues to introduce victim stories from people who were either falsely accused and made to confess after hundreds of hours of interrogation<sup>lxxii</sup> or simply found out that their lives had been combed for information after participating in citizen activism<sup>lxxiii</sup>. *Yomiuri* brings up the police forces mainly in the context of them giving their approval to the law<sup>lxxiv</sup> or voicing worry that the law's requirements will be too limiting to fully make use of<sup>lxxv</sup>. The two referenced articles also touch on the concern *Asahi* voiced so prominently, the first with a police representative's assurance that investigators will work closely together with the prosecution to ensure the legality of investigations, and the second features a jab at the opposition, saying that their objections rely on the supposition that all police are crooked.

Another notable difference in the credence the two newspapers give to a partisan actor is in their handling of the United Nations rapporteur Cannataci. While a general tendency to respect and credit legal and academic authority runs equally in both, the credence they give to Cannataci is starkly opposite. After Cannataci published his letter to Abe on May 18th, neither paper reacted until the 21st, when *Asahi* ran a focus article introducing the contents of

the letter in detail. Since this introduction, *Asahi* referenced Cannataci frequently and respectfully, including granting him first-hand voice in an interview on May 26th, and criticised the government's angry response to the authority of a United Nations official. In contrast, *Yomiuri* does not mention the letter at all until it reports the government's criticism of it on the 23rd. *Yomiuri* continues to solely mention Cannataci in the context of the government criticising his "clearly inappropriate"<sup>lxxvi</sup> letter and questioning his credentials<sup>lxxvii</sup>. As *Yomiuri* only reports the government's words about Cannataci, the only voice this gives him is a short summary of the letter's contents in its introductory article on the subject.

### 8.4.3 Emotional themes – duty, shame and fear

Fear appears at the core of both the security and freedom frames. There is fear for safety in the data, intertwined with the danger of terrorism, and fear for the loss of freedoms, in the name of safety but for the benefit of a heavy-handed government. At the core, these are both fears for a different kind of safety – that of bodies, and that of minds.

Keeping on its chosen track of not mincing words about the APOC, *Asahi* talks about fear much more often, and much more overtly, than *Yomiuri*. *Asahi* begins to build a sense of unease about the APOC from the very start, with several references to "the danger of the law intruding into freedom of thought"<sup>lxxviii</sup> in the main introductory article alone, and a direct comparison to the Peace Preservation Act in a journalist comment on the same front page<sup>lxxix</sup>. Fear enters the discourse slowly, first as formal references to the opposition's "fear that the law could infringe on constitutionally guaranteed rights"<sup>lxxx</sup> or as an interviewee's "fear that citizen groups could become targets of infiltration"<sup>lxxxi</sup>, amid similarly phrased worries for civil liberties and the safety of activist groups. These repeated references build up a catchphrase memory of worry and fear as a logical and appropriate response.

The tone of the debate begins to shift towards the latter half of April, when *Asahi* turns to notable people in the artistic fields for their views on the APOC. Journalist references to the uncomfortable implications of the APOC and the polite worries of politicians remain, but it is the author and artist interviewees who introduce the truly florid language into the discussion. Dramatic figures of speech such as Japan "on the edge of a dark vortex"<sup>lxxxii</sup> or "dangerously close to the point of no return"<sup>lxxxiii</sup> paint a vivid picture of the APOC as a danger that should be truly feared and resisted, else it would lead the country down a path to war. An atmosphere where civil activism withers and the government does not even have to implement any formal

censorship, since the people are too afraid of being watched to do anything, is one of the most commonly voiced fears<sup>lxxxiv lxxxv</sup>. Increasingly towards the end of the examined period, fear starts appearing as a theme in the reader opinions as well, all the more effective for being voiced in the simple words of everyday people: from the 92-year-old who remembers war censorship with "I know that fear in my bones"<sup>lxxxvi</sup>, to the high schooler who starts her letter on June 16th with a simple "I am really scared right now."<sup>lxxxvii</sup>

Compared to the veritable deluge of fear references that *Asahi* brings out, *Yomiuri's* ties to fear as a device are much weaker and less overt. This comes partially from the overall lack of opinion material, but *Yomiuri's* newswriting is also less open to emoting than *Asahi's*. *Yomiuri's* use of fear is entirely tied to the threat of terrorism device, evoking fear by emphasising the necessity and urgency of protective legislation, and the unique horror of terrorism among crimes.

Aside from occasional references in an editorial to "protecting ourselves against the violence of international terrorists"<sup>lxxxviii</sup> or "citizens falling victim to international terrorism"<sup>lxxxix</sup>, *Yomiuri's* emphasis on the dangers of terrorism that citizens must be protected against comes from various quoted partisan sources. Again, the primary source is the government. Abe<sup>xc</sup> and Kaneda<sup>xcj</sup> refer to recent terrorist attacks in Europe repeatedly in the Diet, once memorably on the day after the Manchester concert bombing<sup>xcii</sup>. Several references are made to Daesh by name. One specialist interviewee also begins their statement with "terrorism, which creates countless victims even among other crimes, is especially important to prevent"<sup>xciii</sup>.

The safety of the Tokyo Olympics is a particular repeated theme. The people responsible for the security are reported in the previously referenced article to be welcoming the APOC, while one of *Yomiuri's* few reader opinion letters admits to "feeling great anxiety over Japan's counterterrorist measures as the Olympics are drawing near"<sup>xciv</sup>, and *Yomiuri* itself ties these two threads together as "terrorism keeps occurring in the west, and the threat is getting more severe in Japan as well as we prepare for the Olympics"<sup>xcv</sup>.

Between *Yomiuri's* own repeated references to "international" terrorism, the repeated use of a hijacked plane carrying guests for the Olympics as an example of the sort of crime the APOC targets, and government politicians' reference to specific incidents in Europe, the emphasis is heavy on foreign threat that Japan must be protected against. The government's foregrounding of the law's necessity for the TOC treaty is likely linked to this.

While fear is universal, the other two emotional themes that run in the material appear almost stereotypically Japanese. All participants in turn appeal to a sense of duty and a sense of shame – duty to the people, to society, to future generations, to the international community, and shame for not performing those duties to standard. What differs is the view of what this duty entails, and what actions are bringing the much feared scorn. The main points of this difference were introduced in the frame matrix in Table 1 (page 40).

Both frames designate duties primarily to politicians as legislative actors, and secondly to Japan as a national entity. *Asahi*, additionally, makes occasional reference to the duty of the press to act as watchdog to power. In the freedom frame, the principal duties of politicians are to protect the rights of citizens, and to make meaningful debate. The latter duty is notable firstly for the concentration of its incidences towards the end of the discussion period and secondly for being one of the freedom frame devices to appear in *Yomiuri* to any significant effect. Both papers refer to it in editorials on June 16th<sup>xcvi xcvi</sup>.

In *Asahi's* coverage, the duty of politicians to protect the rights of citizens runs more as an undercurrent reason as to why the opposition should fight against the passage of the APOC than word-for-word references to duty, such as opposition statements that the APOC "concerns freedom of thought, so we will oppose relentlessly"<sup>xcviii</sup>. The duty of Japan as a nation to comply with international human rights standards appears heavily intertwined with this especially after United Nations Rapporteur Cannataci enters the discussion. Although most of the discussion skirts around the word 'duty' with phrasings like "as politicians we must", some direct references do also appear. One of them is a Kōmeitō member's reference to the duty of the diet to prevent broad interpretation of the law<sup>xcix</sup>, which is surprising as this device is primarily used by and in defence of the opposition. An opinion piece from a reader, who recounts recently visiting an exhibition on the development of democracy in Japan, calls for the opposition members to show the same backbone as the politicians that came before them<sup>c</sup>.

In the security frame, the primary duties of politicians and Japan as an entity are largely intertwined into the same references. The duty to protect citizens' lives and public order is presented as the reason for Japan's duty to ratify the TOC treaty. These devices originate, again, from the government's rhetoric. Many of *Yomiuri's* uses of them come from quoted statements, but the duty to ratify the TOC is also brought up in editorials, urging the government to finally ratify the treaty it initially signed 14 years ago<sup>ci</sup>.

It speaks of how much the government emphasised the TOC and international crime as a reason for the law, that the duty to protect comes up almost exclusively in connection to the Olympics. Abe brings the device into the debate with a reference to the duty of a host country to prevent the threat of terrorism in the Olympics<sup>cii</sup>, and Kōmeitō likewise refers to the "self-evident duty" to protect arriving visitors<sup>ciii</sup>. An expert brought into a committee hearing in May, whose statement *Asahi* includes, is the first to refer to "safety and peace of mind for our country"<sup>civ</sup> without making reference to the Olympics, and he too connects that safety to the TOC. Only after the law is passed does Abe talk about enforcing it "appropriately and effectively to protect the lives and livelihoods of citizens"<sup>cv</sup>, a statement that was quoted widely on that day.

The security frame's preoccupation with the TOC treaty is further reflected in the ways it evokes shame. This is the shame of not being up to standard with international law, and of having spent 14 years between the signature and the ratification of the treaty, such as in the previously referenced editorial. Part of the emphasis on urgency is carried over from this: the shame of being among the last 11 nations who have not ratified the treaty – especially among such company as Somalia and South Sudan, as *Yomiuri's* editor points out<sup>cvi</sup> – is brought up even by the Prime Minister<sup>cvii</sup>, and starting from the very first introductory article<sup>cvi</sup>.

In the freedom frame, the shame that is evoked is for not being up to another kind of international standard – that of human rights. Particularly, this device comes up around late May, after Cannataci published his letter. In other words, the shame is not so much in not being up to standard, but in the possibility of receiving criticism for it from outside the national debate. A Democratic Party member quoted in *Asahi* on May 24th refers to Cannataci's criticism as "very disgraceful for a constitutional state"<sup>cix</sup>, and *Asahi* itself voices worry that Japan's human rights efforts will come under questioning from the United Nations after Cannataci's report, while opining that Abe's government has been overly sensitive to this kind of criticism in the past<sup>cx</sup>.

#### 8.4.4 Words of power

In a focus article on the first day of coverage, *Asahi* calls the government's use of the name "terrorism preparation crime" for the APOC a "conspicuous example of public opinion management"<sup>cx</sup>. This quote illustrates the subject of this final chapter: the uses of highly evocative terminology that I call words of power. This is not merely ideologically loaded

lexical choice – these are words loaded with so much importance that their inclusion automatically evokes strong emotions, whether for or against. The use of powerful terminology can be, as *Asahi* shows in the example above, accused of being populist or propagandising, somehow substandard for fact-based public debate.

This is a feature of the discussion that both newspapers accuse their opposing side of relying on. *Asahi* likes to point out that the government is doing "an impressive show of image manipulation"<sup>cxii</sup> by waving around words like 'security' and 'counterterrorism' that "make people stop thinking"<sup>cxiii</sup>, while conveniently neglecting to mention that 'fundamental human rights' and 'surveillance society', some of the opposition's favoured buzzwords, are also such terms. *Yomiuri*'s editor, for his part, names the opposition's 'fearmongering' as the problem in the debate, and tells them to prove their point with factual arguments instead of "crying 'surveillance society'"<sup>cxiv</sup>.

'Freedom' and 'security' as concepts are already themes of high emotional impact. They are both examples of what Nisbet (2010: 47) calls "frames that resonate with an audience's strongly held 'perceptual lenses'": in other words, frames that make strong feelings about another issue relevant. In this case, the relevance is that of deep personal freedoms or physical security to a law proposal in parliament. It follows that these should be greatly effective frames, and it also follows that tying other strong feelings to the issue with further word choice should sink the offered frames in deeper.

Words of power function as the bridge between the text and the receiver's emotions. These are the words that are used to evoke the fear and shame discussed in the previous chapter, the words that paint the picture of a petulant opposition or a despotic government. The most self-evident of these is the ideological load associated with the different names used for the APOC.

*Yomiuri* introduces the APOC as a reintroduction of Prime Minister Koizumi's 'Anti-conspiracy Act' with new, stricter requirements, and reports that the Abe government has chosen the name 'terrorism preparation crime' to emphasise that the law's purpose is for counterterrorism<sup>cxv</sup>. From then on, *Yomiuri* consistently refers to the APOC by the government-given name. All of its uses of 'anti-conspiracy act' refer to Koizumi's proposal, and appear in the context of comparing the APOC favourably to the old proposal. The only exceptions to this in the entire material are direct quotes from those opposing the law. Tying

the very name of a law to a fear-evoking word of power, such as terrorism, transforms the name into an efficient and constant reminder that the law is necessary for security.

Meanwhile, *Asahi* opens with the above quote on conspicuous opinion management, and includes a notice in its main introductory article that since the law includes the gist of the 'anti-conspiracy act', *Asahi* will continue as a principle to use that name, and the government's preferred term will be used "when necessary"<sup>cxvi</sup>. In practice, the name "terrorism preparation crime" appears either in direct quotes from proponents or in the context of a second-hand referral such as "the government is using the name 'terrorism preparation crime'". 'Anti-conspiracy act' is a loaded term not strictly because of its meaning, but because of the history the term carries in Japan. Using the name of a thrice-rejected proposal ties the APOC to that proposal and the arguments and fervour that were used to oppose it, dismissing the differences that the law's proponents emphasise. Whether one considers *Yomiuri's* or *Asahi's* choice the marked formulation depends entirely on the decision whether to trust the government's or the opposition's side of the issue.

Beyond the naming question, *Asahi's* larger and more emotionally involved coverage gives, again, a greater variety to the freedom frame's vocabulary, while the security frame concentrates on a few choice terms. Terrorism and counterterrorism are a pair of words that invited significant discussion in the parliament, as the opposition accused the government of using terrorism as a banner to rally citizens behind, while the spirit of the law was unchanged from before<sup>cxvii</sup>. *Asahi* joined in on this criticism, among other things calling the name change "changing clothes"<sup>cxviii</sup>, "smoke and mirrors"<sup>cxix</sup> and a "facelift"<sup>cxx</sup>. The JFBA also commented to the same effect<sup>cxxi</sup>. An interviewee, who was prominent in the protests against the security guarantee law, gives their words on the effect of the name 'terrorism preparation crime' very clearly: "It is viscerally difficult to oppose something with 'counterterrorism' in the name. I will sit this one out."<sup>cxxii</sup> In this sense, the name appears to have worked as *Asahi* claims it was intended.

In reply to the opposition's various accusations, the government's reaction was to accuse the opposition of fearmongering<sup>cxxiii</sup>. Although what drew the most attention in the parliament was Abe saying this in a radio show in June and refusing to withdraw his statement, this line of argument was actually introduced by *Yomiuri*, who referred to the opposition "purposefully fanning citizens' anxieties" repeatedly in editorials<sup>cxxiv cxxv</sup>. Framing objections to the law as deliberate political manoeuvring rather than genuine concern plays into the choice of casting

the opposition as contrarians who care more about opposing the government than protecting the people.

Even more than accusing the government of opinion management with the constant emphasis on terrorism, those opposing the law used other words to highlight the direness of their cause. The most common of these eye-catching words is 'human rights', which remarkably often appears as the full phrase 'fundamental human rights' or 'the rights of citizens'. Peppering articles with these powerful words, especially together with high-intensity verbs such as 'violate' or 'infringe' may be due to a genuine concern about rights violations, but it is also a powerful tool that builds a phrasal memory and a worry, even fear, in anyone who considers human rights important. 'Constitution' also becomes one of these words of power in the Japanese context, due to the cultural importance of the post-war constitution and especially its pacifist Article 9, and Abe's long-standing goal of abolishing that article along with modifying the rest of the constitution. 'Constitutionally guaranteed human rights' is therefore a double punch phrase of power for the regular *Asahi* reader, who is statistically likely to oppose constitutional revision.

Another interesting example of an outwardly neutral but culturally loaded word choice is 'enforced vote', the parliamentary measure that the government used to bypass the Upper House judicial committee to vote on the law in the plenary session. Although 'enforced vote' is in theory a technical term, referring to a vote decided by the chairman in a situation where a parliamentary committee cannot come to a decision that a vote should be held, it also refers to steamrolling in a more generic sense, and it is therefore no surprise given the newspapers' preferred angles that 'enforced vote' is specifically *Asahi's* primary term of use. While *Asahi* also appends 'enforcement' to other nouns describing the government's actions, *Yomiuri* uses it exactly twice in the whole material, both times directly quoting an opposition politician.

In addition to referring to 'human rights' in general, the opposition and *Asahi* use 'freedom of thought'. In this case the Japanese word choice carries an eye-catching connotation that the English does not convey: the regular term for freedom of speech is 思想の自由 (*shisō no jiyū*), but in this context the common option is 内心の自由 (*naishin no jiyū*). *Shisō* means 'thought' or 'ideology', but *naishin* means 'inner thoughts' or 'innermost heart'. The extra emphasis on one's very inner core being "rudely barged into"<sup>cxxvi</sup> by the government paints a vivid picture. It is interesting that this specific phrase appeared from the very beginning of the debate period and comes from multiple actors, including *Asahi* and interviewed specialists.



Further research into the time period before the start of the parliament debate would be necessary to determine when the connection of this specific phrase to the APOC was made, and by whom.

The theme of fundamental rights violations does not stop at the word 'rights'. One of the most popular words of power, especially noticeable in the parliament debate but equally used by *Asahi's* journalist content and interviewees, is 'surveillance society' and variations. *Asahi* uses "the terror of surveillance" in a headline on the first day of coverage<sup>cxxvii</sup>, and the word appears near-daily especially in May and June. The invasion of privacy is a severe threat, especially in a country like Japan with a history of totalitarian governance in living memory, as proven by *Asahi's* eleven reader letters that recount and reference the horrors of wartime thought police. The Peace Preservation Act, itself a word of power due to the singularly negative connotations it evokes in the collective Japanese consciousness, is a popular point of comparison to the opponents of the APOC, but stands out as a word of power used significantly less in the parliament and more by interviewees and opinion writers, possibly due to it being a too direct accusation to use against the government from the opposition.

In context and presented as a result of surveillance society, the 'withering' of civil society and civil activism is a conspicuously common word choice. It first appears in an expert interview on March 22nd<sup>cxxviii</sup>, is picked up by a Communist party member in the Lower House<sup>cxxix</sup>, and appears remarkably often in the interviews of authors and activists.

The theme of authoritarian governance continues in the wide and varied references to the purported despotism of Abe and his government. Beyond 'surveillance society' and 'Peace Preservation Act', this theme is less concentrated around a single word of power, but no less lacking in emotive examples. References to the destruction of democracy become popular in *Asahi's* coverage towards the end of the discussion period, with such standout language as "hollowing out constitutionalism and furthering a turn to dictatorship"<sup>cxxx</sup>, "the parliament is dying"<sup>cxxxi</sup>, or "democracy stands on the edge of a cliff"<sup>cxxxii</sup>. The APOC is referred to as "Abe's ultimate weapon"<sup>cxxxiii</sup> and parliament debate as "a barren ceremony"<sup>cxxxiv</sup>. An *Asahi* staff member makes the paper's opinion on Abe and the APOC absolutely clear on June 16th with a headline that straddles the line between evocative and theatrical: "This is democracy laid to waste."<sup>cxxxv</sup>

## 9. Conclusions

The aim of this thesis has been to examine how two majority newspapers at different ends of the political spectrum report the same parliament discussion when the issue at hand is highly polarising. Identifying and describing the frames that *Yomiuri Shimbun* and *Asahi Shimbun* use to portray the APOC law proposal itself, as well as the accompanying discussion in the parliament, was the key target of examination. The examination also covered the ways in which they transmitted partisan sources involved in the discussion, as well as the extent to which they disputed those sources or supplemented them with other information, and which main linguistic means they used for that purpose. In order to do this, I performed a hybrid framing analysis followed by a supplementary qualitative analysis using tools from critical discourse analysis.

The primary frames identified in the analysis are a security frame and a freedom frame. The security frame emphasises that the APOC is important for counterterrorism and the ratification of the international TOC treaty. It stresses the threat posed by terrorist attacks and the duty of Japan as a future Olympic host to maximise security. In the parliament discussion, the security frame portrays the opposition parties as political schemers and places the blame of the debate's lack of progress on them.

The freedom frame foregrounds the concerns that the APOC poses a danger to civil rights. It emphasises the law's wide scope and vague wording leading to the possibility of ordinary citizens being targeted by terrorist investigations, and suggests that the government is purposefully aiming to set up a surveillance society. The government is portrayed as either authoritarian or incompetent, and the stereotyping of Prime Minister Abe as a despotic leader is particularly prominent.

Conservative *Yomiuri* primarily used the security frame in its coverage of the APOC. It took the government's side in its extensive coverage of the strife in the parliament, but also criticised both the opposition and the government for what it considered to be poor debating. *Yomiuri's* writing was characterised by the uncritical transmission of partisan sources, with the government overwhelmingly featuring as the main source. Sources from outside the parliament discussion were scarce. One particular feature was *Yomiuri's* concentration on the urgency of the law, for both security reasons and more prosaic concerns of political manoeuvring. *Yomiuri's* editorials argued in favour of the security frame, but primarily followed the government's set of devices without offering anything new to the discussion. Its

use of experientially or relationally loaded language was sparing, and primarily concentrated in word choices that discredited the opposition.

The liberal *Asahi* used the freedom frame almost exclusively. It transmitted both the government's and the opposition's statements, but commonly disputed the government's words and criticised their handling of the debate. *Asahi* also introduced partisan sources from outside the parliament, with a heavy emphasis on the coverage of popular protests against the law. *Asahi's* language was much more expressive than *Yomiuri's*, evoking fear for the state of civil rights and distrust in the government with lexical and grammatical choices.

Based on my knowledge of the parliament discussion, I had hypothesised the appearance of a security frame and a freedom frame in the newspapers, and the hypothesis was also correct in which newspaper supported which frame. This was more a presupposition than a true hypothesis: the papers' political alignments are well known. Further, I hypothesised that both newspapers would primarily transmit partisan frames from the parliament uncritically, signifying a lack of investigative reporting, and that *Asahi* would cover the anti-government protests in a positive light, but *Yomiuri* would omit them entirely.

This was only partially correct. The hypothesis that the newspapers would mainly transmit partisan frames without comment was only true for *Yomiuri*. While *Yomiuri's* focus on transmitting the events of the parliament discussion without commentary or extra sources makes it seem quite neutral on the surface, its agenda management and lexical choices clearly benefitted the government at the opposition's expense. Therefore it cannot be said to have been uncritical, though the criticism that does appear is hardly related to investigative reporting. *Yomiuri* did also cover the protests, though only briefly, and even included several statements from interviewed protesters.

Meanwhile, the hypothesis was entirely off regarding the criticality of *Asahi's* coverage. *Asahi* hardly transmitted the government's partisan frame without critical commentary, and while it was more sympathetic to the opposition, they also received some criticism. However, the criticism of partisan sources was limited to the criticism of those in the parliament, with very few exceptions. In this, *Asahi's* ability to choose its own interviewees likely affects its willingness to criticise them. Despite the critical tone, *Asahi's* coverage also does not show significant evidence of true investigative journalism. *Asahi* does include regular and in-depth explanatory articles of the APOC and its possible uses, so it is possible that the lack of investigative reporting may be rather due to the nature and timescale of the issue than a lack

of investigative power. *Asahi's* protest coverage was positive as hypothesised, however also even larger than expected, with an unforeseen emphasis on government-critical reader letters and intelligentsia interviews.

One completely unexpected feature of the coverage was both of the newspapers' heavy emphasis on the description of political strife over the nature of the law proposal itself. It was natural that this would come up, but I had expected the greater part of the newspaper discussion to concentrate on the law and its possible consequences, with the political manoeuvring in the parliament running as a side topic. Instead, especially *Yomiuri* placed the political strife at the centre of the agenda and the APOC almost as a separate topic. While the devices centred on the security angle outnumber the devices centred on the strife in *Yomiuri's* coverage, the qualitative analysis emphasised the strife elements. Both the opposition and, to a lesser extent, the government were portrayed as having concerns that had more to do with an upcoming election than the law proposal being discussed. With the heavy emphasis on politics, it is debatable whether security was *Yomiuri's* primary frame at all, because it is debatable whether the APOC was *Yomiuri's* primary topic at all. Additionally, almost all of its devices for the security frame come from the government, so the motivation behind *Yomiuri's* framing may also be less an endorsement of security and more a simple endorsement of the government.

However, *Yomiuri's* editorials are heavily in favour of the security frame, and one of its few journalist-origin devices is the criticism that the proposal may not be strict *enough*. This would speak for security being the primary frame of the APOC. I made the conscious decision at the inductive coding stage to consider the description of political strife a part of the freedom–security frame pair: I still stand by this decision for the same reasons, as even *Yomiuri*, with its greater emphasis on strife, still constantly links the strife back to the APOC. Furthermore, foregrounding the strife so significantly could speak of a conscious attempt to background its contents – to erase the law's problems by giving them low salience.

*Asahi's* coverage of the political strife was more clearly linked to the freedom frame, as government authoritarianism is a central danger in the freedom frame, and *Asahi* was able to use the strife in the parliament to frame Abe's government as dangerous in this way. However, *Asahi's* chosen frame may be just as politically motivated as *Yomiuri's*: its belligerent history with Abe Shinzō has left it with little love for the LDP and its recent politics, and a clear current of distrust in the authorities – LDP, Abe himself and the police alike – runs across its

coverage. Trust or distrust in the authorities is both a features of these frames and a prerequisite for using them.

Based on these features, it can be concluded that slant, as defined by Entman, is quite evident in both newspapers. Security and freedom may be the frames, but supporting or opposing of the government is the slant. Complete ignorance of one side's angle was neither paper's preferred way, but both paid very little attention to non-parliamentary partisan groups that did not support their preferred frame. In the parliament, however, derogating the opposing side was the rule rather than the exception. *Yomiuri* may give voice to opposition politicians without direct comment, but at the same time its coverage heavily emphasises the opposition's petulant irresponsibility, so how much credence can such a voice carry? *Asahi*, for its part, primarily reproduces the government arguments only to question them.

Entman does not mention how long a slant has to hold up to be considered a content bias, but the consistency of both newspapers' preference over a period of almost 90 days leads me to call this a content bias, especially considering that both newspapers are in accordance with their stated political alignment. This last fact means that likely a capitalist bias is also at work behind the decisions of what to report and how to frame it: both newspapers are catering to their expected audience. Without interview or survey based research it is impossible to truly determine whether the bias that appears is a conscious choice, because as Entman noted, favouring one side can also be a result of that side delivering their message more skilfully, but in a case like this, it is likely that the reporter's own political opinions also affect their decision-making bias, and therefore which side's arguments they consider more convincing.

Another evident bias in the material is a significant watchdog bias for *Asahi*, with its focus on the past wrongdoings – and the fear for future ones – of government and investigative authorities alike. An interesting detail in this focus is how much of it comes from reader letters and the interviews of activists, lawyers and historians. *Asahi* is at liberty to choose its outsider sources, so it cannot be said that the distrust of authorities comes organically from citizens, but the frequent inclusion of their worries certainly helps *Asahi* emphasise its angle that the APOC is a problem that concerns everyone. By contrast, *Yomiuri's* framing portrays the topic as wholly belonging in the realm of politics.

Even discounting interviewees and opinion writers who are free to air their personal views, the colourfulness of the newspapers' language was surprising. *Asahi's* editorials in particular contain some truly venomous turns of phrase, the bulk of it aimed at the government. In

newswriting as well, *Asahi's* vocabulary and grammar have been shown here to carry significant experiential value. The traditional ethos of journalism is that the news are neutrally presented fact and the paper's opinion only comes across in editorials; while *Asahi* keeps its direct opinions out of news articles, the chosen angle and the tone of the language certainly carries it. In comparison, *Yomiuri's* writing style is on the surface far more neutral and opinions are kept to editorials. However, *Yomiuri* too slips loaded vocabulary into its descriptive language and reporting verbs.

However, *Yomiuri* frames rather by omission than by loaded vocabulary. *Asahi's* framing is overt and active, declaring opinions and including a journalist frame of popular resistance, but *Yomiuri* keeps to more neutral language, declarative sentences, and the partisan frames originating from the parliament. The output could even be described as neutral at first glance, but a closer look at the extent to which the security frame dominates in the coverage, as well as how much criticism of the opposition dominates the security frame, reveals the truth. *Yomiuri's* framing is subtler than *Asahi's*, functioning by the omission of other angles rather than by the active propagation of the favoured one, but it is there.

The differences in the coverage of parliament events – the exact same source – show that careful selection of which facts to include, exclude and emphasise makes a vast difference in the output. Although reading either *Asahi* or *Yomiuri* a reader could be quite content that what they are presented with is reality, looking at both of them side by side unveils the forces at play. This is the power of framing: it is almost as if reading reports of two entirely different incidents. The difference in the two newspapers' political stances is not just merely apparent in their language, it is there in the very reality that they choose to report. The target reader groups of *Asahi* and *Yomiuri* are very different, so this gives a worrying idea of how different the realities offered to different segments of the Japanese population are. It is more than likely that newspaper subscribers get their news from more than one source, but how will this one-sided framing affect the way they view those other sources? And how do those other sources affect their view of the reality offered here?

What is not visible in the results, even though the background of Japanese journalism had led me to expect it, is any evidence of *kisha* club interference in the reporting. There is very little overlap in the contents, topics or timing of the articles beyond the coverage of the parliament developments, no oddly identical wordings without a public source, and no evidence of both newspapers avoiding a particular angle. This may speak for the declining power of the clubs,

but it may also simply be due to the topic being an active parliament discussion, meaning that a significant primary source was completely public.

This material gives a bipolar view on whether the agenda-setting power of Japanese journalists is indeed weakened and the freedom of press diminishing, as is the common belief in literature. *Asahi's* coverage is varied and includes a wealth of sources, and their primary frame is in direct opposition to the government: this would point to a significant amount of liberty remaining. At the same time, *Yomiuri* relies almost completely on partisan devices, and most of those devices come from the government: there is little journalist foray outside that which is provided by the parliament. *Asahi's* loss of the investigative reporting section has clearly not completely taken its edge off, as it appears unafraid of political backlash from negative framing – or, perhaps, it is counting on political backlash benefiting its own image as a watchdog in this situation. *Yomiuri's* lack of contrasting viewpoints could be the paper's genuine choice, or could be indicative of *Yomiuri* taking extra care to preserve "neutral and unbiased" reporting by avoiding opinions that contrast with the government. The evidence of this research is not sufficient to make conclusions about this. The reasoning behind the newspapers' framing choices was not a target of inquiry and would have been impossible to research with these methods, but interview or survey based research into the journalists' reasons for their framing choices is a very interesting future option.

Given *Asahi's* spirited opposition of the government, George Mulgan's and Nakano's worry that the liberty of the Japanese press is already a thing of the past appears overrated based on this data. However, although this material would suggest that the press are at liberty to report what they wish, absence of evidence in a single case study is not evidence of absence in society at large, and looking at the themes in *Asahi's* coverage and its reader-submitted content, at least a subsection of Japanese society certainly feels the oppressive atmosphere that was referenced so much. Thus I cannot agree with Cucek's criticism of Abe's critics either. Based on this research, I find myself most in agreement with Yamada, fearing for an oppressive atmosphere in society more than formal censorship.

This research has identified the frames used in the newspaper coverage and detailed their structure and most predominant devices. For this purpose the method as I have modified from van Gorp's model works quite well, and should be repeatable to anyone who is interested in making an in-depth framing analysis. Its greatest limitation is the inherent subjectivity of framing: although this method has been calibrated as precisely as possible to minimise

subjectivity, the reality of only one analyst working on the material remains. This limitation could be overcome by working with a partner. The method's greatest strength, on the other hand, is the extensive possibilities it offers for in-depth analysis of the framing devices.

As a future topic using this same method, the framing of Abe specifically across different newspapers would be extremely interesting to undertake, especially given *Asahi* and *Yomiuri's* vastly different images of him. Introducing more newspapers from all over the political spectrum into the comparison would broaden the picture. This would build a solid mapping of both Abe's public image and the main newspapers' political alignments beyond self-description. Given *Yomiuri's* conspicuous lack of opinion independent of the government, a more in-depth look at this one newspaper specifically, across several recent political topics, would be necessary to determine its level of journalistic independence and true views. Regarding the APOC law, meanwhile, a follow-up examination into the ways the law has come to be used so far warrants interest, to see whether *Yomiuri's* or *Asahi's* frames for the future hold true. The Tokyo Olympics, one of Abe's stated primary reasons for pushing the law, still lie ahead, now newly moved to 2021.

Whichever newspaper's vision for Japan's future with the APOC has come true, this research has demonstrated that the news we read make a significant difference in the reality we live in. Japan has been thought of as a monolithic and unfailingly polite society, but results as divided as these, and the varied, colourful and sometimes scathing language in the material, should give cause to update those views.



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- xliii *Yomiuri Shimbun* 7.4.2017: [スキャナー]「犯罪」判断基準 焦点に テロ準備罪法案
- xliv *Yomiuri Shimbun* 28.3.2017: [社説] 17年度予算成立 「森友」一色の議論で良いのか
- xlvi *Yomiuri Shimbun* 24.5.2017: テロ準備罪 衆院通過 不安あおらず冷静な議論を(解説)
- xlv *Yomiuri Shimbun* 15.6.2017: [スキャナー] テロ準備罪 与党「奇策」 参院「中間報告」 自民、公明に配慮
- xlvi *Yomiuri Shimbun* 16.6.2017: [論点スペシャル] テロ準備罪法成立 どう見る
- xlvi *Asahi Shimbun* 20.5.2017: 「共謀罪」熟議なき可決 採決強行、異論を軽視 自公維、賛成多数 衆院委
- lxix *Asahi Shimbun* 15.6.2017: 疑問、残したまま 「共謀罪」法案、きょう成立
- l *Asahi Shimbun* 22.4.2017: (社説)「共謀罪」審議 数の力を乱用するな
- li *Asahi Shimbun* 16.6.2017: 言論の府、審議封殺 「中間報告」自民内でも苦言 「共謀罪」法成立
- lii *Asahi Shimbun* 31.3.2017: 「共謀罪」優先、他の法案は? 6日審議入り方針、野党反発
- liii *Asahi Shimbun* 17.5.2017: (声)投票を放棄すれば人権をも失う
- liv *Yomiuri Shimbun* 23.5.2017: テロ準備罪きょう衆院通過 自民方針、野党は抵抗の構え
- lv *Yomiuri Shimbun* 29.3.2017: 訓練や標的監視も「テロ等」準備行為 政府が答弁書
- lvi *Yomiuri Shimbun* 16.6.2017: [社説] テロ準備罪成立 凶行を未然に防ぐ努力続けよ
- lvii *Yomiuri Shimbun* 16.6.2017: 都議選前 駆け込み決着 テロ準備罪法成立 運営「乱暴」 与党も戸惑い
- lviii *Asahi Shimbun* 16.6.2017: 刑事司法の大転換点 「共謀罪」法成立
- lix *Asahi Shimbun* 13.5.2017: 「共謀罪」の問題、指摘続々 自公、18日通過目指す
- lx *Asahi Shimbun* 6.4.2017: 「共謀罪」追及、法相に照準 4野党、廃案掲げ質疑へ
- lxi *Asahi Shimbun* 31.3.2017: 「成案出た」金田法相へ、民進が質問40項目 「共謀罪」法案
- lxii *Yomiuri Shimbun* 18.4.2017: 民進 法相に質問集中 衆院決算委 「森友」関連1問だけ テロ準備罪法案追及
- lxiii *Yomiuri Shimbun* 16.6.2017 [編集手帳] 6月16日
- lxiv *Asahi Shimbun* 27.4.2017: (問う「共謀罪」 表現者から)「異質」切り捨て、加速する懸念 落合恵子さん
- lxv *Asahi Shimbun* 6.6.2017: (問う「共謀罪」 学問の世界から)怒りの抗議、重なるリットン調査団 加藤陽子さん
- lxvi *Yomiuri Shimbun* 20.4.2017: テロ準備罪 早速火花 政府参考人採決巡り騒然 全会一致 慣例破る
- lxvii *Yomiuri Shimbun* 20.5.2017: テロ準備罪 安堵と抗議 衆院委可決
- lxviii *Asahi Shimbun* 20.5.2017: 審議、わずか30時間 「共謀罪」採決、「煮詰まらないまま」
- lxix *Asahi Shimbun* 1.6.2017: (問う「共謀罪」) 審議を吟味、音読広がる 臨場感あふれる再現、苦笑いとため息
- lxx *Asahi Shimbun* 7.4.2017: (社説)「共謀罪」審議 政権の体質が見える
- lxxi *Asahi Shimbun* 22.3.2017: 監視の恐怖さらに 「共謀罪」法案

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- lxxii *Asahi Shimbun* 14.5.2017: 筋書き通りの自白、危惧 「共謀罪」少ない物証、供述頼みに？
- lxxiii *Asahi Shimbun* 22.5.2017: (声) 「共謀罪」、尾行体験思い出す
- lxxiv *Yomiuri Shimbun* 16.6.2017: テロ準備罪法 歓迎と懸念 警察幹部 該当行為「慎重に検討」
- lxxv *Yomiuri Shimbun* 16.6.2017: [論点スペシャル] テロ準備罪法成立 どう見る
- lxxvi *Yomiuri Shimbun* 23.5.2017: 政府 国連人権理事会に抗議 テロ準備罪懸念の書簡受け
- lxxvii *Yomiuri Shimbun* 30.5.2017: 国連書簡 首相が批判
- lxxviii *Asahi Shimbun* 22.3.2017: 「共謀罪」全面対決へ 与野党、会期末にらみ 法案閣議決定
- lxxix *Asahi Shimbun* 22.3.2017: (天声人語) 治安維持法の下暮らし
- lxxx *Asahi Shimbun* 7.4.2017: (時時刻刻) 「共謀罪」早くも激論 首相「テロ」前面 野党「内心を処罰」
- lxxxi *Asahi Shimbun* 15.4.2017: (問う「共謀罪」) 元刑事裁判官の弁護士に聞く
- lxxxii *Asahi Shimbun* 18.4.2017: (問う「共謀罪」) 反対・懸念、表現者からも 恣意的な運用「将来分からぬ」
- lxxxiii *Asahi Shimbun* 20.4.2017: (問う「共謀罪」 表現者から) 「戦前と違う」とは思わない 半藤一利さん
- lxxxiv *Asahi Shimbun* 19.4.2017: (問う「共謀罪」 表現者から) 心の内、絶えず監視される社会に 周防正行さん
- lxxxv *Asahi Shimbun* 21.4.2017: (問う「共謀罪」 表現者から) 監視で犯罪「予防」、歯止め失う 平野啓一郎さん
- lxxxvi *Asahi Shimbun* 26.5.2017: (声) 戦争知らぬ世代へ、92歳の憂慮
- lxxxvii *Asahi Shimbun* 16.6.2017: (声) 「共謀罪」、誰のための法律なのか
- lxxxviii *Yomiuri Shimbun* 24.5.2017: [社説] テロ準備罪法案 普通の国民は監視の対象外だ
- lxxxix *Yomiuri Shimbun* 16.6.2017: [社説] テロ準備罪成立 凶行を未然に防ぐ努力続けよ
- xc *Yomiuri Shimbun* 7.4.2017: [スクヤナー] 「犯罪」判断基準 焦点に テロ準備罪法案
- xcii *Yomiuri Shimbun* 15.4.2017: テロ準備罪で「未然防止」 法相 衆院委で審議入り
- xcii *Yomiuri Shimbun* 24.5.2017: 安全な五輪へ「前進」 テロ準備罪衆院通過 捜査幹部ら歓迎
- xciii *Yomiuri Shimbun* 16.6.2017: [論点スペシャル] テロ準備罪法成立 どう見る
- xciv *Yomiuri Shimbun* 1.5.2017: [気流] 5月1日(投書)
- xcv *Yomiuri Shimbun* 16.6.2017: [スクヤナー] テロ抑止へ一歩 準備罪法成立 適用には高いハードル
- xcvi *Yomiuri Shimbun* 16.6.2017: [社説] テロ準備罪成立 凶行を未然に防ぐ努力続けよ
- xcvii *Asahi Shimbun* 16.6.2017: (社説) 権力の病弊 「共謀罪」市民が監視を
- xcviii *Asahi Shimbun* 28.3.2017: 新年度予算成立、97.4兆円 「共謀罪」後半国会の焦点
- xcix *Asahi Shimbun* 26.4.2017: 「市民を萎縮させる」懸念 「犯罪の主体を限定」評価 「共謀罪」衆院委参考人質疑
- c *Asahi Shimbun* 10.6.2017: (声) 野党よ、民主主義守る気骨示せ
- ci *Yomiuri Shimbun* 24.4.2017: [社説] テロ準備罪法案 国民の不安を丁寧に払拭せよ
- cii *Yomiuri Shimbun* 7.4.2017: テロ防止「五輪へ責務」 首相強調 「準備罪」審議入り 野党は廃案訴え
- ciii *Yomiuri Shimbun* 24.5.2017: 安全な五輪へ「前進」 テロ準備罪衆院通過 捜査幹部ら歓迎
- civ *Asahi Shimbun* 17.5.2017: 「警察の活動、大きく拡大」 「厳格な要件、乱用はない」 「共謀罪」法案、参考人質疑
- cv *Yomiuri Shimbun* 16.6.2017: 組織犯罪 未然に防止 テロ準備罪法成立 国会 きょう実質閉会
- cvi *Yomiuri Shimbun* 16.6.2017: [社説] テロ準備罪成立 凶行を未然に防ぐ努力続けよ
- cvi *Yomiuri Shimbun* 30.5.2017: テロ準備罪 参院で攻防開始
- cvi *Yomiuri Shimbun* 22.3.2017: テロ準備罪法案 国会提出 政府 成立要件を厳格化

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- <sup>cix</sup> *Asahi Shimbun* 24.5.2017: 「共謀罪」真っ向対立 自・公、英テロ触れ必要性主張／民・共、国連報告者の懸念強調
- <sup>cx</sup> *Asahi Shimbun* 31.5.2017: 国連報告者、どんな人? 「共謀罪」書簡に政府ピリピリ
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Asahi Shimbun* 22.3.2017: (時時刻刻) 「テロ」強調、本質変わらず 政府案文言なし、異例の追加「共謀罪」
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Asahi Shimbun* 7.6.2017: (天声人語) 印象操作という言葉
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Asahi Shimbun* 13.5.2017: (問う「共謀罪」 言論人から) 思考停止の雰囲気、それでいいのか 江川紹子さん
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Yomiuri Shimbun* 10.5.2017 [社説] テロ準備罪審議 政府参考人の答弁は問題ない
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Yomiuri Shimbun* 22.3.2017: テロ準備罪法案 条文要旨と対象犯罪
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Asahi Shimbun* 22.3.2017: 「共謀罪」全面対決へ 与野党、会期末にらみ 法案閣議決定
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Asahi Shimbun* 22.3.2017: (時時刻刻) 「テロ」強調、本質変わらず 政府案文言なし、異例の追加「共謀罪」
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Asahi Shimbun* 7.4.2017: 「共謀罪」攻防 政権、会期内成立狙う 4 野党「廃案を」訴え 衆院審議入り
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Asahi Shimbun* 22.3.2017: (社説) 「共謀罪」法案 疑問尽きない化粧直し
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Asahi Shimbun* 22.3.2017: 「共謀罪」全面対決へ 与野党、会期末にらみ 法案閣議決定
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Asahi Shimbun* 24.3.2017: (教えて! 「共謀罪」パート2: 7) 「テロ防止に役立つ」って本当?
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Asahi Shimbun* 24.5.2017: 無関心、打破したい 大学生「主張する場を守る」 「共謀罪」衆院通過
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Asahi Shimbun* 2.6.2017: 「不安広げるための議論」 首相、国会審議を批判 「共謀罪」
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Yomiuri Shimbun* 24.5.2017: テロ準備罪 衆院通過 不安あおらず冷静な議論を(解説)
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Yomiuri Shimbun* 16.6.2017: [社説] テロ準備罪成立 凶行を未然に防ぐ努力続けよ
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Asahi Shimbun* 17.4.2017: (政治断簡) 汝、内心に立ち入るべからず 編集委員・国分高史
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Asahi Shimbun* 22.3.2017: 監視の恐怖さらに 「共謀罪」法案
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Asahi Shimbun* 22.3.2017: <考論>新倉修氏、安部川元伸氏に聞く 「共謀罪」法案
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Asahi Shimbun* 7.4.2017: (時時刻刻) 「共謀罪」早くも激論 首相「テロ」前面 野党「内心を処罰」
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Asahi Shimbun* 11.6.2017: (問う「共謀罪」 学問の世界から) 政府の狙いは隣人を密告するマインド 内田樹さん
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Asahi Shimbun* 15.6.2017: (問う「共謀罪」) 国会、どう見る 識者らに聞く
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Asahi Shimbun* 15.6.2017: (問う「共謀罪」) 国会、どう見る 識者らに聞く
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Asahi Shimbun* 16.6.2017: (声) 「共謀罪」手中の政府、監視しよう
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Asahi Shimbun* 16.6.2017: (耕論) 熟議は幻想か 脇雅史さん、大山礼子さん、遥洋子さん
- <sup>cxi</sup> *Asahi Shimbun* 16.6.2017: 民主主義の荒廃した姿 「共謀罪」法成立 東京社会部長・長谷川玲



## APPENDIX A. *Codebook*

### Does the article suggest that

1. APOC is comparable to the old 共謀罪?
2. without APOC Japan will become a safe haven for international criminals?
3. problems of APOC could be solved by cooperation with Cannataci?
4. the government is being uncooperative?
5. APOC will increase public safety?
6. PM Abe's behaviour is despotic?
7. APOC is comparable to wartime Peace Preservation laws?
8. APOC is necessary for ratifying the TOC treaty?
9. JM Kaneda's incompetence is a problem in the discussion?
10. the press has a duty to be the watchdog of power?
11. those opposing APOC are misinformed?
12. terrorism is a buzzword tacked onto the text?
13. APOC is different from 共謀罪?
14. apathetic reaction from the public is a problem?
15. citizens should protest against APOC?
16. similar laws in foreign countries are stricter?
17. APOC will result in human rights limitations?
18. APOC is necessary to protect Japan from organised crime? (other than terrorism)
19. the opposition is using delay tactics?
20. there is a time pressure to pass this law?
21. the government is being uncooperative?
22. APOC is necessary to protect Japan from terrorism?
23. problems of APOC could be solved with meaningful debate in the parliament?
24. Japan's current laws are insufficient?
25. APOC will result in a surveillance society?
26. other countries made no new laws to adhere to TOC, so Japan shouldn't either?
27. the problems could be solved by the government explaining APOC carefully?
28. the opposition is resisting for the sake of opposing the government?
29. there is a duty to protect citizens' rights?
30. the parliament has a duty to produce meaningful discussion?
31. there is a duty to protect future generations?
32. politicians have a duty to protect citizens?
33. citizens do not understand the law and this is a problem?
34. APOC is necessary for security during the Olympics?
35. ordinary citizens may be targeted by APOC?
36. APOC infringes the constitution?
37. the criteria for what constitutes a crime are vague?
38. the government wants to use APOC to increase surveillance?
39. Japan has a duty to comply with international law?
40. the problems could be solved by the government making concessions to the opposition?
41. APOC may result in arbitrary investigation?
42. the government wants to use APOC to make it harder to oppose those in power?
43. other countries already signed the TOC so Japan should too?

- 44. Justice Minister Kaneda's actions are objectionable?
- 45. APOC will make police investigations easier?
- 46. the problems could be solved by passing APOC quickly?
- 47. the arguments of the government are inconsistent, and this is a problem?
- 48. APOC should be rejected, modified, and brought up again later?

**does the article refer to**

- 49. a government source?
- 50. a legal expert?
- 51. an opposition politician?
- 52. a protester or activist source?
- 53. a member of the intelligentsia?
- 54. a source in the police?

**does the article use images that portray**

- 55. disorder in the parliament?
- 56. danger imagery such as bombs, guns or explosions?
- 57. protesters or crowds of people?

## APPENDIX B. Full list of framing and reasoning devices

The devices for each frame are listed by order of frequency in the newspaper where that was the dominant frame.

### Security frame

<i>Devices</i>	<i>Yomiuri Shimbun</i>	<i>Asahi Shimbun</i>
stereotype: opposition as contrarian	59	0
problem source: irresponsibility of opposition	48	11
problem source: opponents are misinformed	38	9
problem: danger of terrorist attack	35	14
solution: urgency	35	2
problem: danger of other organised crime	27	5
reason: need to sign TOC	27	21
solution: careful government explanation	26	1
reason: counterterrorism	25	26
consequence: safe Olympics	23	13
comparison: difference to old Anti-conspiracy bill	17	1
consequence: ease of investigation	16	5
problem source: opposition's delay tactics	15	0
solution: government concessions	12	1
problem: insufficiency of current law	11	7
duty: comply with international law	10	5
duty: protect citizens' lives and public order	7	3
appeal to emotion: shame	7	0
problem: safe haven for criminals if TOC is not ratified	4	1
consequence: public safety	4	2
comparison: stricter foreign laws	3	5
visual: disorder in parliament	2	0
visual: terrorist imagery	3	0

## Freedom frame

<i>Devices</i>	<i>Asahi Shimbun</i>	<i>Yomuri Shimbun</i>
stereotype: Abe as despot	179	24
consequence: human rights limitations	154	8
problem: ordinary people targeted	128	17
problem: government authoritarianism	110	18
consequence: surveillance society	90	11
problem: vague criteria	83	10
problem: possibility of arbitrary investigation	63	9
problem source: inconsistency of arguments	62	0
comparison: Peace Preservation Act	60	1
reason: making it harder to oppose government	59	0
problem: terrorism unrelated to law	55	0
comparison: similarity to old Anti-conspiracy bill	45	1
duty: meaningful debate	34	6
solution: meaningful debate	33	0
solution: raise voices in protest	28	0
consequence: infringing constitution	24	0
problem source: apathetic citizens	22	0
problem: lack of citizen understanding	21	0
reason: increasing surveillance	18	3
visual: protesters	13	1
duty: must protect future generations	12	0
duty: watchdog press	11	0
duty: must protect rights	8	2
solution: cooperation with Cannataci	5	0
comparison: other countries made no new laws for TOC	4	0
solution: reject it and try again	2	0
solution: careful consideration	0	3